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Abstract
We study multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where the
objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible. Instead of the
well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE), a refinement of NE well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. It is known that
there always exists an SPE in quantitative reachability games and that the constrained existence
problem is decidable. We here prove that this problem is PSPACE-complete. To obtain this result,
we propose a new algorithm that iteratively builds a set of constraints characterizing the set of
SPE outcomes in quantitative reachability games. This set of constraints is obtained by iterating
an operator that reinforces the constraints up to obtaining a fixpoint. With this fixpoint, the set of
SPE outcomes can be represented by a finite graph of size at most exponential. A careful inspection
of the computation allows us to establish PSPACE membership.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Software and its engineering → Formal methods; Theory of
computation → Logic and verification; Theory of computation → Solution concepts in game theory
Keywords and phrases multiplayer non-zero-sum games played on graphs ; quantitative reachability
objectives ;subgame perfect equilibria ; constrained existence problem
1 Introduction
While two-player zero-sum games played on graphs are the most studied model to formal-
ize and solve the reactive synthesis problem [26], recent work has considered non-zero-sum
extensions of this mathematical framework, see e.g. [15, 19, 7, 22, 6, 5, 17, 4, 1], see also
the surveys [21, 3, 13]. In the zero-sum game approach, the system and the environment
are considered as monolithic and fully adversarial entities. Unfortunately, both assumptions
may turn to be too strong. First, the reactive system may be composed of several compon-
ents that execute concurrently and have their own purpose. So, it is natural to model such
systems with multiplayer games with each player having his own objective. Second, the en-
vironment usually has its own objective too, and this objective is usually not the negation of
the objective of the reactive system as postulated in the zero-sum case. Therefore, there are
instances of the reactive synthesis problem for which no solution exists in the zero-sum set-
ting, i.e. no winning strategy for the system against a completely antagonistic environment,
while there exists a strategy for the system which enforces the desired properties against all
rational behaviors of the environment pursuing its own objective.
2 The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games
While the central solution concept in zero-sum games is the notion of winning strategy,
it is well known that this solution concept is not sufficient to reason about non-zero-sum
games. In non-zero-sum games, notions of equilibria are used to reason about the rational
behavior of players. The celebrated notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) [24] is one of the
most studied. A profile of strategies is an NE if no player has an incentive to deviate,
i.e. change his strategy and obtain a better reward, when this player knows that the other
players will be playing their respective strategies in the profile. A well-known weakness of
NE in sequential games, which include infinite duration games played on graphs, is that
they are subject to non-credible threats: decisions in subgames that are irrational and used
to threaten the other players and oblige them to follow a given behavior. To avoid this
problem, the concept of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) has been proposed, see e.g. [25].
In the framework of systems subject to bugs, this means that the players will keep playing
rationally in all situations, i.e. when no bug occurs and after any bug’s occurrence. SPEs
are NEs with the additional property that they are also NEs in all subgames of the original
game. While it is now quite well understood how to handle NEs algorithmically in games
played on graphs [28, 29, 12, 17], this is not the case for SPEs.
Contributions In this paper, we provide an algorithm to decide in polynomial space the
constrained existence problem for SPEs in quantitative reachability games. A quantitative
reachability game is played by n players on a finite graph in which each player has his own
reachability objective. The objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices
as quickly as possible. In a series of papers, it has been shown that SPEs always exist
in quantitative reachability games [8], and that the set of outcomes of SPEs in a quantit-
ative reachability game is a regular language which is effectively constructible [11]. As a
consequence of the latter result, the constrained existence problem for SPEs is decidable.
Unfortunately, the proof that establishes the regularity of the set of possible outcomes
of SPEs in [11] exploits a well-quasi order for proving termination and it cannot be used to
obtain a good upper bound on the complexity for the algorithm. Here, we propose a new
algorithm and we show that this set of outcomes can be represented using an automaton of
size at most exponential. It follows that the constrained existence problem for SPEs can be
decided in PSPACE. We also provide a matching lower-bound showing that this problem is
PSPACE-complete.
Our new algorithm iteratively builds a set of constraints that exactly characterize the set
of SPEs in quantitative reachability games. This set of constraints is obtained by iterating
an operator that reinforces the constraints up to obtaining a fixpoint. A careful inspection
of the computation allows us to establish PSPACE membership.
Related work Algorithms to reason on NEs in graph games are studied in [28] for ω-
regular objectives and in [29, 12] for quantitative objectives. Algorithms to reason on SPEs
are given in [27] for ω-regular objectives. Quantitative reachability objectives are not ω-
regular objectives. Reasoning about NEs and SPEs for ω-regular specifications can also be
done using strategy logics [16, 23].
Other notions of rationality and their use for reactive synthesis have been studied in
the literature: rational synthesis in cooperative [19] and adversarial [22] setting, and their
algorithmic complexity has been studied in [17]. Extensions with imperfect information have
been investigated in [18]. Synthesis rules based on the notion of admissible strategies have
been studied in [2, 7, 6, 5, 4, 1]. Weak SPEs have been studied in [11, 14, 9] and shown to
be equivalent to SPEs for quantitative reachability objectives. Fixpoint techniques are used
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in [20, 11, 14] to establish the existence of (weak) SPEs in some classes of games, however
they cannot be used in our context to get complexity results.
Structure of the paper In Section 2, we recall the notions of n − player graph games
and (very weak/weak) SPEs, we introduce the notion of extendend games and we state
the studied constrained existence problem. In Section 3, we provide a way to characterize
the set of plays that are outcomes of SPEs and give an algorithm to construct this set.
This algorithm relies on the computation of a sequence of labeling functions (λk)k∈N until
reaching a fixpoint λ∗ such that the plays which are λ∗-consistent are exactly the plays
which are outcomes of SPEs. In Section 4, given a labeling function λ, we introduce the
notion of counter graph in which infinite paths correspond to λ−consistent plays. We also
show that each such graph has an exponential size. In Section 5, using counter graphs, we
prove the PSPACE-easyness of the constrained existence problem. We conclude by proving
the PSPACE-hardness of this problem.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the notions of quantitative reachability game and subgame perfect
equilibrium. We also state the problem studied in this paper and our main result.
2.1 Quantitative reachability games
An arena is a tuple G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E) where Π = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of n players,
V is a finite set of vertices with |V | ≥ 2, (Vi)i∈Π is a partition of V between the players, and
E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges such that for all v ∈ V there exists v′ ∈ V such that (v, v′) ∈ E.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that |Π| ≤ |V |.
A play in G is an infinite sequence of vertices ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . such that for all k ∈ N,
(ρk, ρk+1) ∈ E. A history is a finite sequence h = h0h1 . . . hk with k ∈ N defined similarly.
The length |h| of h is the number k of its edges. We denote the set of plays by Plays and
the set of histories by Hist (when it is necessary, we use notation PlaysG and HistG to recall
the underlying arena G). Moreover, the set Histi is the set of histories such that their last
vertex v is a vertex of player i, i.e. v ∈ Vi.
Given a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Plays and k ∈ N, the prefix ρ0ρ1 . . . ρk of ρ is denoted by
ρ≤k and its suffix ρkρk+1 . . . is denoted by ρ≥k. A play ρ is called a lasso if it is of the form
ρ = hℓω with hℓ ∈ Hist. Notice that ℓ is not necessary a simple cycle. The length of a lasso
hℓω is the length of hℓ.
Given an arena G, we denote by Succ(v) = {v′ | (v, v′) ∈ E} the set of successors of v,
for v ∈ V , and by Succ∗ the transitive closure of Succ.
A quantitative game G = (G, (Costi)i∈Π) is an arena equipped with a cost function profile
Cost = (Costi)i∈Π such that each function Costi : Plays→ R∪{+∞} assigns a cost to each
play. In a quantitative game G, an initial vertex v0 ∈ V is often fixed, and we call (G, v0)
an initialized game. A play (resp. a history) of (G, v0) is then a play (resp. a history) of G
starting in v0. The set of such plays (resp. histories) is denoted by Plays(v0) (resp. Hist(v0)).
We also use notation Histi(v0) when these histories end in a vertex v ∈ Vi.
In this article we are interested in quantitative reachability games such that each player
has a target set of vertices that he wants to reach. The cost to pay is equal to the number
of edges to reach the target set, and each player aims at minimizing his cost.
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◮ Definition 1 (Quantitative reachability game). A quantitative reachability game is a tuple
G = (G, (Fi)i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π) such that
G is an arena;
for each i ∈ Π, Fi ⊆ V is the target set of player i;
for each i ∈ Π and each ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Plays, Costi(ρ) is equal to the least index k such
that ρk ∈ Fi, and to +∞ if no such index exists.
In the sequel of this document, we simply call such a game a reachability game. Notice
that the cost function used for reachability games can be supposed to be continuous in the
following sense [8]. With V endowed with the discrete topology and V ω with the product
topology, a sequence of plays (ρn)n∈N converges to ρ if every prefix of ρ is a prefix of all
ρn except, possibly, finitely many of them. A cost function Costi is continuous if whenever
limn→+∞ ρn = ρ, we have that limn→+∞ Costi(ρn) = Costi(ρ). In reachability games, the
function Costi can be transformed into a continuous one as follows: Cost
′
i(ρ) = 1−
1
Costi(ρ)+1
if Costi(ρ) < +∞, and Cost
′
i(ρ) = 1 otherwise.
Given a quantitative game G, a strategy of a player i ∈ Π is a function σi : Histi → V .
This function assigns to each history hv, with v ∈ Vi, a vertex v′ such that (v, v′) ∈ E.
In an initialized game (G, v0), σi needs only to be defined for histories starting in v0. A
play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is consistent with σi if for all ρk ∈ Vi we have that σi(ρ0 . . . ρk) =
ρk+1. A strategy σi is positional if it only depends on the last vertex of the history, i.e.,
σi(hv) = σi(v) for all hv ∈ Histi. It is finite-memory if it can be encoded by a finite-
state machine M = (M,m0, αu, αn) where M is a finite set of states (the memory of the
strategy), m0 ∈M is the initial memory state, αu : M ×V →M is the update function, and
αn : M × Vi → V is the next-action function. The machine M defines a strategy σi such
that σi(hv) = αn(α̂u(m0, h), v) for all histories hv ∈ Histi, where α̂u extends αu to histories
as expected. The size of the strategy σi is the size |M | of its machine M. Note that σi is
positional when |M | = 1.
A strategy profile is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈Π of strategies, one for each player. It is called
positional (resp. finite-memory) if for all i ∈ Π, σi is positional (resp. finite-memory).
Given an initialized game (G, v0) and a strategy profile σ, there exists an unique play from
v0 consistent with each strategy σi. We call this play the outcome of σ and it is denoted by
〈σ〉v0 . Let c = (ci)i∈Π ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})
|Π|, we say that σ is a strategy profile with cost c or
that 〈σ〉v0 has cost c if ci = Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) for all i ∈ Π.
2.2 Solution concepts and constraint problem
In the multiplayer game setting, the solution concepts usually studied are equilibria (see [21]).
We here recall the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.
Let σ = (σi)i∈Π be a strategy profile in an initialized game (G, v0). When we highlight the
role of player i, we denote σ by (σi, σ−i) where σ−i is the profile (σj)j∈Π\{i}. A strategy σ
′
i 6=
σi is a deviating strategy of player i, and it is a profitable deviation for him if Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) >
Costi(〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0).
The notion of Nash equilibrium is classical: a strategy profile σ in an initialized game
(G, v0) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from
his strategy, i.e. no player has a profitable deviation. Formally, σ is an NE if for each i ∈ Π
and each deviating strategy σ′i of player i, we have Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ Costi(〈σ
′
i, σ−i〉v0).
When considering games played on graphs, a useful refinement of NE is the concept of
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) which is a strategy profile being an NE in each subgame.
It is well-known that contrarily to NEs, SPEs avoid non-credible threats [21]. Formally,
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v5 v4 v0 v1 v6 v7
v2
v3
Figure 1 A quantitative reachability game: player 1 (resp. player 2) owns circle (resp. square)
vertices and F1 = {v2} and F2 = {v2, v5}.
given a quantitative game G = (G,Cost), an initial vertex v0, and a history hv ∈ Hist(v0),
the initialized game (G↾h, v) is called a subgame of (G, v0) such that G↾h = (G,Cost↾h) and
Costi↾h(ρ) = Costi(hρ) for all i ∈ Π and ρ ∈ V ω. Notice that (G, v0) is subgame of itself.
Moreover if σi is a strategy for player i in (G, v0), then σi↾h denotes the strategy in (G↾h, v)
such that for all histories h′ ∈ Histi(v), σi↾h(h′) = σi(hh′). Similarly, from a strategy profile
σ in (G, v0), we derive the strategy profile σ↾h in (G↾h, v).
◮ Definition 2 (Subgame perfect equilibrium). Let (G, v0) be an initialized game. A strategy
profile σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in (G, v0) if for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), σ↾h is an NE
in (G↾h, v).
It is proved in [8] that there always exists an SPE in reachability games. In this paper,
we are interested in solving the following constraint problem.
◮ Definition 3 (Constraint problem). Given (G, v0) an initialized reachability game and two
threshold vectors x, y ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})|Π|, the constraint problem is to decide whether there
exists an SPE in (G, v0) with cost c such that x ≤ c ≤ y, that is, xi ≤ ci ≤ yi for all i ∈ Π.
Our main result is the following one:
◮ Theorem 4. The constraint problem for initialized reachability games is PSPACE-complete.
The sequel of the paper is devoted to the proof of this result. Let us first illustrate the
introduced concepts with an example.
◮ Example 5. A reachability game G = (G, (Fi)i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π) with two players is depicted
in Figure 1. The circle vertices are owned by player 1 whereas the square vertices are owned
by player 2. The target sets of both players are respectively equal to F1 = {v2} (grey vertex),
F2 = {v2, v5} (double circled vertices).
The positional strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is depicted by double arrows, its outcome
in (G, v0) is equal to 〈σ〉v0 = (v0v1v6v7v2)
ω with cost (4, 4). Let us explain that σ is an
NE. Player 1 reaches his target set as soon as possible and has thus no incentive to deviate.
Player 2 has no profitable deviation that allows him to reach v5. For instance if he uses a
deviating positional strategy σ′2 such that σ
′
2(v0) = v4, then the outcome of (σ1, σ
′
2) is equal
to (v0v4)
ω with cost (+∞,+∞) which is not profitable for player 2.
One can verify that the strategy profile σ is also an SPE. For instance in the subgame
(G↾h, v5) with h = v0v4, we have ρ = 〈σ↾h〉v5 = v5v4(v0v1v6v7v2)
ω such that Cost↾h(ρ) =
Cost(hρ) = (8, 2). In this subgame, with ρ, both players reach their target set as soon as
possible and have thus no incentive to deviate.
Consider now the positional strategy profile σ′ = (σ′1, σ
′
2) such that σ
′
1(v4) = v0, σ
′
1(v1) =
v3, and σ
′
2(v4) = v0. Its outcome in (G, v0) is equal to (v0v4)
ω with cost (+∞,+∞). Let
us explain that σ′ is an NE. On one hand, since player 2 never goes to v1, player 1 has no
incentive to deviate, as his target is only accessible from v1. On the other hand, if player 2
deviates and chooses to go to v1, his cost is still +∞ since player 1 goes to v3. However,
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the strategy profile σ′ is not an SPE. Indeed, it features an non-credible threat by player 1:
consider the history v0v1 and the corresponding subgame (G↾v0 , v1). In that case, player 1
has an incentive to deviate to reach v2 to yield a cost of 4. Thus, the strategy profile σ
′
↾v0
is not a NE in the subgame (G↾v0 , v1), and thus is not an SPE in (G, v0). ◭
2.3 Weak SPE, very weak SPE and extended game
In this section, we present two important tools that will be repeatedly used in the sequel.
First, we explain that in reachability games, the notion of SPE can be replaced by the
simpler notion of very weak SPE. Second we present an extended version of a reachability
game where the vertices are enriched with the set of players that have already visited their
target sets along a history. Working with this extended game is essential to prove that the
constraint problem for reachability games is in PSPACE.
We begin by recalling the concepts of weak and very weak SPE introduced in [11, 14].
Let (G, v0) be an initialized game and σ = (σi)i∈Π be a strategy profile. Given i ∈ Π,
we say that a strategy σ′i is finitely deviating from σi if σ
′
i and σi only differ on a finite
number of histories, and that σ′i is one-shot deviating from σi if σ
′
i and σi only differ on
v0. A strategy profile σ is a weak NE (resp. very weak NE) in (G, v0) if, for each player
i ∈ Π, for each finitely deviating (resp. one-shot) strategy σ′i of player i from σi, we have
Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ Costi(〈σ
′
i, σ−i〉v0 ). A strategy profile σ is a weak SPE (resp. very weak SPE)
in (G, v0) if, for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), σ↾h is a weak (resp. very weak) NE in (G↾h, v).
From the given definitions, every SPE is a weak SPE, and every weak SPE is a very weak
SPE. It is known that weak SPE and very weak SPE are equivalent notions and that there
exist initialized games that have a weak SPE but no SPE; nevertheless, all three concepts
are equivalent for initialized reachability games [11, 14].
◮ Proposition 6 ([11, 14]). Let (G, v0) be a initialized reachability game and σ be a strategy
profile in (G, v0). Then σ is an SPE if and only if σ is a weak SPE if and only if σ is a very
weak SPE.
Let us now recall the notion of extended game for a given reachability game G (see
e.g. [9]). The vertices (v, I) of the extended game store a vertex v ∈ V as well as a subset
I ⊆ Π of players that have already visited their target sets.
◮ Definition 7 (Extended game). Let G = (G, (Fi)i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π) be a reachability game
with an arena G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E), and let v0 be an initial vertex. The extended game
of G is equal to X = (X, (FXi )i∈Π, (Cost
X
i )i∈Π) with the arena X = (Π, V
X , (V Xi )i∈Π, E
X),
such that:
V X = V × 2Π
((v, I), (v′, I ′)) ∈ EX if and only if (v, v′) ∈ E and I ′ = I ∪ {i ∈ Π | v′ ∈ Fi}
(v, I) ∈ V Xi if and only if v ∈ Vi
(v, I) ∈ FXi if and only if i ∈ I
for each ρ ∈ PlaysX , Cost
X
i (ρ) is equal to the least index k such that ρk ∈ F
X
i , and to
+∞ if no such index exists.
The initialized extended game (X , x0) associated with the initialized game (G, v0) is such that
x0 = (v0, I0) with I0 = {i ∈ Π | v0 ∈ Fi}.
Notice the way each target set FXi is defined: if v ∈ Fi, then (v, I) ∈ F
X
i but also
(v′, I ′) ∈ FXi for all (v
′, I ′) ∈ Succ∗(v, I). In the sequel, to avoid heavy notations, each cost
function CostXi will be simply written as Costi.
T. Brihaye, V. Bruyère, A. Goeminne, J.-F. Raskin and M. van den Bogaard 7
The extended game of the reachability game of Figure 1 is depicted in Figure 2. We will
come back to this example at the end of this section.
Let us state some properties of the extended game. First, notice that for each ρ =
(v0, I0)(v1, I1) . . . ∈ PlaysX(x0), we have the next property called I-monotonicity:
Ik ⊆ Ik+1 for all k ∈ N. (1)
Second, given an initialized game (G, v0) and its extended game (X , x0), there is a one-
to-one correspondence between plays in PlaysG(v0) and plays in PlaysX(x0):
from ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ PlaysG(v0), we derive ρ
X = (ρ0, I0)(ρ1, I1) . . . ∈ PlaysX(x0) such
that Ik is the set of players i that have seen their target set Fi along ρ≤k;
from ρ = (v0, I0)(v1, I1) . . . ∈ PlaysX(x0), we derive ρ
G = v0v1 . . . ∈ PlaysG(v0) such
that the second components Ik, k ∈ N, are omitted.
Third, given ρ ∈ PlaysG(v0), we have that Cost(ρ
X) = Cost(ρ), and conversely given
ρ ∈ PlaysX(x0), we have that Cost(ρ
G) = Cost(ρ). It follows that outcomes of SPE can be
equivalently studied in (G, v0) and in (X , x0), as stated in the next lemma.
◮ Lemma 8. If ρ is the outcome of an SPE in (G, v0), then ρX is the outcome of an SPE
in (X , x0) with the same cost. Conversely, if ρ is the outcome of an SPE in (X , x0), then
ρG is the outcome of an SPE in (G, v0) with the same cost.
By construction, the arena X of the initialized extended game is divided into different
regions according to the players who have already visited their target set. Let us provide
some useful notions with respect to this decomposition. We will often use them in the
following sections. Let I = {I ⊆ Π | there exists v ∈ V such that (v, I) ∈ Succ∗(x0)} be the
set of sets I accessible from the initial state x0, and let N = |I| be its size. For I, I ′ ∈ I
with I 6= I ′, if there exists ((v, I), (v′, I ′)) ∈ EX , we say that I ′ is a successor of I and we
write I ′ ∈ Succ(I). Given I ∈ I, XI = (V I , EI) refers to the sub-arena of X restricted to
the vertices {(v, I) ∈ V X | v ∈ V }. We say that XI is the region1 associated with I. Such a
region XI is called a bottom region whenever Succ(I) = ∅.
There exists a partial order on I such that I < I ′ if and only if I ′ ∈ Succ∗(I) \ {I}. We
fix an arbitrary total order on I that extends this partial order < as follows:
J1 < J2 < . . . < JN . (2)
(with XJN a bottom region).2 With respect to this total order, given n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we
denote by X≥Jn = (V ≥Jn , E≥Jn) the sub-arena of X restricted to the vertices {(v, I) ∈
V X | I ≥ Jn}.
The total order given in (2) together with the I-monotonicity (see (1)) leads to the
following lemma.
◮ Lemma 9 (Region decomposition and section). Let π be a (finite or infinite) path in X .
Then there exists a region decomposition of π as
π[ℓ]π[ℓ + 1] . . . π[m]
with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m ≤ N , such that for each n, ℓ ≤ n ≤ m:
1 In the sequel, we indifferently call region either XI , or V I , or I .
2 We use notation Jn, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, to avoid any confusion with the sets Ik appearing in a play
ρ = (v0, I0)(v1, I1) . . ..
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v0, ∅
4
v1, ∅
3
v6, ∅
2
v7, ∅
1
v3, ∅ +∞
v4, ∅
+∞
v5, {2}
+∞
v4, {2}
+∞
v0, {2}
0
v1, {2}
3
v6, {2}
2
v7, {2}
1
v3, {2}+∞
v2, {1, 2} 0
v0, {1, 2}
0
v1, {1, 2}
0
v6, {1, 2}
0
v7, {1, 2}
0
v3, {1, 2}
0
v4, {1, 2}
0
v5, {1, 2}
0
Figure 2 The extended game (X , x0) for the initialized game (G, v0) of Figure 1. The values of
a labeling function λ are indicated close to each vertex.
π[n] is a (possibly empty) path in X ,
every vertex of π[n] are of the form (v, Jn) for some v ∈ V .
Each path π[n] is called a section. The last section π[m] is infinite if and only if π is infinite.
◮ Example 10. Let us come back to the initialized game (G, v0) of Figure 1. Its extended
game (X , x0) is depicted in Figure 2 (only the part reachable from the initial vertex x0 =
(v0, ∅) is depicted; for the moment the reader should not consider the labeling indicated
under or next to the vertices). As we can see, the extended game is divided into three
different regions: one region associated to I = ∅ that contains the initial vertex x0, a second
region associated to I = {2}, and a third bottom region associated to I = {1, 2}. Hence the
set I = {∅, {2},Π} is totally ordered as J1 = ∅ < J2 = {2} < J3 = Π.
For all the vertices (v, I) of the region associated with I = {2}, we have (v, I) 6∈ FX1 and
(v, I) ∈ FX2 , and for those of the region associated with I = Π, we have (v, I) ∈ F
X
1 ∩ F
X
2 .
From the SPE σ given in Example 5 with outcome ρ = (v0v1v6v7v2)
ω ∈ PlaysG(v0) and
cost (4, 4), we derive the SPE outcome ρX ∈ PlaysX(x0) equal to
(v0, ∅)(v1, ∅)(v6, ∅)(v7, ∅)((v2,Π)(v0,Π)(v1,Π)(v6,Π)(v7,Π))
ω
with the same cost (4, 4). The region decomposition of ρX is equal to ρX [1]ρX [2]ρX [3] such
that ρX [1] = (v0, ∅)(v1, ∅)(v6, ∅)(v7, ∅), ρX [2] is empty, and ρX [3] = ((v2,Π)(v0,Π)(v1,Π)(v6,Π)(v7,Π))ω.
◭
3 Characterization
In this section, given an initialized reachability game (G, v0), we characterize the set of plays
that are outcomes of SPEs, and we provide an algorithm to construct this set. For this
characterization, by Lemma 8, we can work on the extended game (X , x0) instead of (G, v0).
Moreover by Proposition 6, we can focus on very weak SPEs only since they are equivalent
to SPEs. Such a characterization already appears in [11] however with a different algorithm
that cannot be used to obtain good complexity upper bounds for the constraint problem.
All along this section, when we refer to a vertex of V X , we use notation v (instead of
(u, I)) and notation I(v) means the second component I of this vertex.
Our algorithm iteratively builds a set of constraints imposed by a labeling function λ :
V X → N∪ {+∞} such that the plays of the extended game satisfying those constraints are
exactly the SPE outcomes. Let us provide a formal definition of such a function λ with the
constraints that it imposes on plays.
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◮ Definition 11 (λ-consistent play). Let X be the extended game of a reachability game G,
and λ : V X → N∪{+∞} be a labeling function. Given v ∈ V X , for all plays ρ ∈ PlaysX(v),
we say that ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is λ-consistent if for all n ∈ N and i ∈ Π such that ρn ∈ Vi:
Costi(ρ≥n) ≤ λ(ρn). (3)
We denote by Λ(v) the set of plays ρ ∈ PlaysX(v) that are λ-consistent.
Thus, a play ρ is λ-consistent if for all its suffixes ρ≥n, if player i owns ρn then the
number of edges to reach his target set along ρ≥n is bounded by λ(ρn). Before going into
the details of our algorithm, let us intuitively explain on an example how a well-chosen
labeling function characterizes the set of SPE outcomes.
◮ Example 12. We consider the extended game (X , x0) of Figure 2, and a labeling function
λ whose values are indicated under or next to each vertex.
If v ∈ V Xi is labeled by λ(v) = c, then if c ∈ N0, this means that player i will only
accept outcomes in (X , v) that reach his target set within c steps, otherwise he would have
a profitable deviation. If λ(v) = 0, this means that player i has already reached his target
set, and if λ(v) = +∞, player i has no profitable deviation whatever outcome is proposed
to him.
In Example 10 was given the SPE outcome equal to
ρ = (v0, ∅)(v1, ∅)(v6, ∅)(v7, ∅)((v2,Π)(v0,Π)(v1,Π)(v6,Π)(v7,Π))
ω
and with cost (4, 4). We have λ(v0, ∅) = 4 and player 2 reaches his target set from (v0, ∅)
within exactly 4 steps. The constraints imposed by λ on the other vertices of ρ are respected
too.
Recall now the strategy profile σ′ with outcome ρ′ = ((v0, ∅)(v4, ∅))ω described in Ex-
ample 5. The outcome ρ′ is not λ-consistent since player 2 does not reach his target set,
and so in particular he does not reach his target set within 4 steps. We already know that
σ′ is not an SPE from Example 5. In fact all the profiles that yield ρ′ as an outcome are
not SPEs. ◭
Our algorithm roughly works as follows: the labeling function λ that characterizes the set
of SPE outcomes is obtained from an initial labeling function that imposes no constraints,
by iterating an operator that reinforces the constraints step after step, up to obtaining a
fixpoint which is the required function λ. Thus, if λk is the labeling function computed
at step k and Λk(v), v ∈ V X , the related sets of λk-consistent plays, initially we have
Λ0(v) = PlaysX(v), and step by step, the constraints imposed by λ
k become stronger and
the sets Λk(v) become smaller, until a fixpoint is reached.
Initially, we want a labeling function λ0 that imposes no constraint on the plays. We
could define λ0 as the constant function +∞. We proceed a little bit differently. Indeed recall
the definition of the target sets (FXi )i∈Π in an extended game (see Definition 7): v ∈ F
X
i if
and only if i ∈ I(v). Hence, given ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . ., once ρk ∈ FXi for some k ∈ N then ρn ∈ F
X
i
for all n ≥ k. It follows that for all n ≥ k, Costi(ρ≥n) = 0 and the inequality (3) is trivially
true. (See also Example 12.) Therefore we define the labeling function λ0 as follows.
◮ Definition 13 (Initial labeling). For all v ∈ V X , let i ∈ Π be such that v ∈ V Xi ,
λ0(v) =
{
0 if i ∈ I(v)
+∞ otherwise.
10 The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games
◮ Lemma 14. ρ ∈ Λ0(v) if and only if ρ ∈ PlaysX(v).
Let us now explain how our algorithm computes the labeling functions λk, k ≥ 1, and
the related sets Λk(v), v ∈ V X . It works in a bottom-up manner, according to the total
order J1 < J2 < . . . < JN of I given in (2): it first iteratively updates the labeling function
for all vertices v of the arena XJN until reaching a fixpoint in this arena, it then repeats this
procedure in X≥JN−1, X≥JN−2, . . ., X≥J1 = X . Hence, suppose that we currently treat the
arena X≥Jn and that we want to compute λk+1 from λk. We define the updated function
λk+1 as follows (we use the convention that 1 + (+∞) = +∞).
◮ Definition 15 (Labeling update). Let k ≥ 0 and suppose that we treat the arena X≥Jn,
with n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For all v ∈ V X ,
if v ∈ V ≥Jn , let i ∈ Π be such that v ∈ V Xi , then
λk+1(v) =
0 if i ∈ I(v)1 + min
(v,v′)∈EX
sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ
k(v′)} otherwise
if v 6∈ V ≥Jn , then
λk+1(v) = λk(v).
Let us provide some explanations. As this update concerns the arena X≥Jn , we keep
λk+1 = λk outside of this arena. Suppose now that v belongs to the arena X≥Jn and
v ∈ V Xi . We define λ
k+1(v) = 0 whenever i ∈ I(v) (as already explained for the definition
of λ0). When it is updated, the value λk+1(v) represents what is the best cost that player i
can ensure for himself with a “one-shot” choice by only taking into account plays of Λk(v′)
with v′ ∈ Succ(v).
Notice that it makes sense to run the algorithm in a bottom-up fashion according to the
total ordering J1 < . . . < JN since given a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . ., if ρ0 is a vertex of V
≥Jn , then
for all k ∈ N, ρk is a vertex of V
≥Jn (by I-monotonicity). Moreover running the algorithm
in this way is essential to prove that the constraint problem for reachability games is in
PSPACE.
◮ Example 16. We consider again the extended game (X , x0) of Figure 2 with the total
order J1 = ∅ < J2 = {2} < J3 = JN = Π of its set I.
Let us illustrate Definition 15 on the arena X≥J2 . Let k > 0 and suppose that the
labeling function λk has been computed such that λk(v0, J2) = +∞, λk(v1, J2) = 3 and
λk(v4, J2) = +∞ (notice λk is not the labeling indicated in Figure 2). Let us show how
to compute λk+1(v0, J2). We need to compute sup{Cost2(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ
k(v′)} for the two
successors v′ of (v0, J2), that is, respectively v
′ = (v1, J2) and v
′ = (v4, J2). Recall that
Λk(v′) is the set of all plays λk-consistent from v′. Thus, as λk(v1, J2) = 3, the set Λ
k(v1, J2)
consists only of the plays that go to (v6, J2), as any play that goes to (v3, J2) has at least
cost 6 for player 1. All the plays in Λk(v1, J2) have cost 3 for player 1 and player 2. Thus,
sup{Cost2(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v1, J2)} = 3. On the other hand, as λk(v4, J2) = +∞, the play
(v4, J2)
ω is λk-consistent and belongs to Λk(v4, J2). Thus, sup{Cost2(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v1, J2)} =
+∞. Hence, the minimum is attained with successor (v1, J2), and λk+1(v0, J2) = 4. ◭
We can now provide our algorithm that computes the sequence (λk(v))k∈N until a fixpoint
is reached (see Proposition 17 below). Initially, the labeling function is λ0 (see Definition 13).
For the next steps k > 0, we begin with the bottom region XJN of X and update λk−1 to
λk as described in Definition 15. At some point, the values of λk do not change anymore in
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XJN and (λk)k∈N reaches locally (on X
JN ) a fixpoint (see again Proposition 17). Now, we
consider the arena X≥JN−1 and in the same way, we continue to update locally the values of
λk in X≥JN−1. We repeat this procedure with arenas X≥JN−2, X≥JN−3, ... until the arena
X≥J1 = X is completely processed. From the last computed λk, we derive the sets Λk(v),
v ∈ V X , that we need for the characterization of outcomes of SPEs (see Theorem 20 below).
An example illustrating the execution of this algorithm is given at the end of this section.
Algorithm 1: Fixpoint
compute λ0
k ← 0
n← N
while n 6= 0 do
repeat
k ← k + 1
compute λk from λk−1 with respect to X≥Jn
until λk = λk−1
n← n− 1
end
return λk.
We now state that the sequence (λk)k∈N computed by this algorithm reaches a fixpoint
- locally on each arena X≥Jn and globally on X - in the following meaning:
◮ Proposition 17. There exists a sequence of integers 0 = k∗N < k
∗
N−1 < . . . < k
∗
1 = k
∗ such
that
Local fixpoint: for all Jn ∈ I, all m ∈ N and all v ∈ V ≥Jn ,
λk
∗
n+m(v) = λk
∗
n(v). (4)
Global fixpoint: in particular, with k∗ = k∗1 , for all m ∈ N and all v ∈ V
X ,
λk
∗+m(v) = λk
∗
(v).
The global fixpoint λk
∗
is also simply denoted by λ∗, and the set Λk
∗
is denoted by Λ∗.
This proposition indicates that Algorithm 1 terminates. Indeed for each Jn ∈ I, taking
the least index k∗n which makes Equality (4) true shows that the repeat loop is broken and
the variable n decremented by 1. The value n = 0 is eventually reached and the algorithm
stops with the global fixpoint λ∗. Notice that the first local fixpoint is reached with k∗N = 0
because XJN is a bottom region.
Proposition 17 also shows that when a local fixpoint is reached in the arena X≥Jn+1 and
the algorithm updates the labeling function λk in the arenaX≥Jn , the values of λk(v) do not
change anymore for any v ∈ V ≥Jn+1 but can still be modified for some v ∈ V Jn . Recall also
that outside of X≥Jn, the values of λk(v) are still equal to the initial values λ0(v). These
properties will be useful when we will prove that the constraint problem for reachability
games is in PSPACE. They are summarized in the next lemma.
◮ Lemma 18. Let k ∈ N be a step of the algorithm and let Jn with n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For all
v ∈ V Jn :
if k ≤ k∗n+1, then λ
k+1(v) = λk(v) = λ0(v),
if k∗n ≤ k, then λ
k+1(v) = λk(v) = λk
∗
n(v),
Hence the values of λk(v) and λk+1(v) may be different only when k∗n+1 < k < k
∗
n.
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To prove Proposition 17, we have to prove that the sequences (λk(v))k∈N, with v ∈ V X ,
are non increasing.
◮ Lemma 19. For all v ∈ V X , the sequences (λk(v))k∈N and (Λk(v))k∈N are non increasing.
Proof. Let us prove by induction on k that for all v ∈ V X
λk+1(v) ≤ λk(v). (5)
We will get that Λk+1(v) ⊆ Λk(v) by Definition 11.
First, notice that λk(v) = 0 if and only if i ∈ I(v), where i is the player owning v. So, in
this case, λk+1(v) = λk(v) = 0 and assertion (5) is proved. It remains to prove this assertion
when i 6∈ I(v).
For k = 0, let v ∈ V Xi such that i 6∈ I(v), then λ
0(v) = +∞ and obviously λ1(v) ≤ λ0(v).
Suppose that assertion (5) is true for k and let us prove it for k+1. We know by induction
hypothesis that for all v′ ∈ V X , λk+1(v′) ≤ λk(v′), and thus also
Λk+1(v′) ⊆ Λk(v′). (6)
Let us prove that for all v ∈ V Xi such that i 6∈ I(v), λ
k+2(v) ≤ λk+1(v). If λk+2(v) =
λk+1(v) or λk+1(v) = +∞, then the assertion is proved. Otherwise,
λk+1(v) = 1 + min
(v,v′)∈EX
sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ
k(v′)}.
By (6), it follows that
λk+1(v) ≥ 1 + min
(v,v′)∈EX
sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ
k+1(v′)} = λk+2(v).
And so, the assertion again holds. ◭
We can now prove Proposition 17.
Proof of Proposition 17. The base case is easily proved. As V JN is a bottom region, we
have λ1(v) = λ0(v) for all v ∈ V JN , and thus the local fixpoint is immediately reached on
V JN . Hence with k∗N = 0, for all m ∈ N and all v ∈ V
JN , λk
∗
N+m(v) = λk
∗
N (v).
Let Jn be a element of I, with n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. Suppose that a fixpoint has been
reached in the arena X≥Jn+1 and that the labeling function λk is udpated on the arena
X≥Jn as described in Definition 15. Recall that the previously computed values of λk do no
longer change on X≥Jn+1 (a fixpoint is reached) and they do not change outside of V ≥Jn
(by construction). However they can be modified on XJn . In this region XJn , there are |V |
sequences (λk(v))k∈N, v ∈ V Jn , since the vertices v are of the form v = (u, Jn) where Jn is
fixed. These sequences are non increasing by Lemma 19. As the component-wise ordering
over (N∪{+∞})|V | is a well-quasi-ordering, there exists a natural number k∗n that we choose
as small as possible such that for all v ∈ V Jn , λk
∗
n+1(v) = λk
∗
n(v). This equality also holds
for all v ∈ V ≥Jn (and not only for V Jn), and it follows that for all m ∈ N and all v ∈ V ≥Jn ,
λk
∗
n+m(v) = λk
∗
n(v).
Notice that when n is decremented in Algorithm 1, k is incremented at least once showing
that the sequence 0 < k∗N < k
∗
N−1 < . . . < k
∗
1 = k
∗ is strictly increasing.
Finally, the last arena processed by the algorithm is X≥J1 = X . So with k∗ = k∗1 , we
have that for all v ∈ V and all m ∈ N, λk
∗+m(v) = λk
∗
(v). ◭
We are ready to state how we characterize plays that are outcomes of SPEs. This is
possible with the fixpoint computed by Algorithm 1.
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◮ Theorem 20 (Characterization). Let (G, v0) be an initialized quantitative game and (X , x0)
be its extended game. Let ρ be a play in PlaysX(x0). Then ρ is the outcome of an SPE in
(X , x0) if and only if for all v ∈ Succ
∗(x0), Λ
∗(v) 6= ∅ and ρ ∈ Λ∗(x0).
Notice that this theorem also provides a characterization of the outcomes of SPEs in
(G, v0) by Lemma 8.
The two implications of Theorem 20 respectively follow from Proposition 23 and Propos-
ition 24 given below. We first need to establish an important property satisfied by the sets
Λk(v): when for some player i, the costs Costi(ρ) associated with the plays ρ in Λ
k(v) are
unbounded, there actually exists a play in this set that has an infinite cost. In other terms,
either Λk(v) contains at least one play ρ with an infinite cost Costi(ρ) or there exists a finite
maximal cost for all ρ in Λk(v).
◮ Proposition 21. For every k ∈ N, for every v ∈ V X and for every i ∈ Π, the following
implication holds: if sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v)} = +∞, then there exists a play ρ ∈ Λk(v)
such that Costi(ρ) = +∞.
Proof. Let k ∈ N and let v ∈ V X , we assume that sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v)} = +∞, that
is, for all n ∈ N, there exists ρn ∈ Λk(v) such that Costi(ρn) > n. By König’s lemma, there
exist (ρnℓ)ℓ∈N a subsequence of (ρ
n)n∈N and ρ ∈ PlaysX(v) such that ρ = limℓ→+∞ ρ
nℓ .
Moreover, Costi(ρ) = +∞ as Costi can be transformed into a continuous function. Let us
prove that
ρ ∈ Λk(v).
This will establish Proposition 21.
We prove by induction on t with 0 ≤ t ≤ k that ρ ∈ Λt(v). If t = 0, as Λ0(v) = PlaysX(v)
by Lemma 14, then ρ = limℓ→+∞ ρ
nℓ ∈ PlaysX(v). It follows that ρ ∈ Λ
0(v).
Let t > 0 and assume that the assertion is true for t− 1 < k. Suppose by contradiction
that ρ 6∈ Λt(v). For all ℓ ∈ N, as ρnℓ ∈ Λk(v), we have ρnℓ ∈ Λt(v) by Lemma 19. Moreover
by induction hypothesis we have ρ ∈ Λt−1(v). It follows that there exists m ∈ N and j ∈ Π
with ρm ∈ Vj such that
Costj(ρ≥m) > λ
t(ρm) and Costj(ρ≥m) ≤ λt−1(ρm).
In particular, λt(ρm) < λ
t−1(ρm) and thus λ
t(ρm) < +∞, and player j does not reach his
target set along π = ρ0 . . . ρm . . . ρm+λt(ρm). We choose nℓ large enough such that ρ and
ρnℓ share a common prefix of length at least |π|. As Costj(ρ≥m) > λt(ρm), it follows that
Costj(ρ
ℓn
≥m) > λ
t(ρm). We can conclude that ρ
nℓ 6∈ Λt(v) which leads to a contradiction. ◭
The next corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 21 with the convention that
the max belongs to N ∪ {+∞}.
◮ Corollary 22. sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ
k(v)} = max{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ
k(v)}.
The two implications of Theorem 20 are proved in the following Proposition 23 and
Proposition 24.
◮ Proposition 23. If σ is an SPE in (X , x0) then for all v ∈ Succ
∗(x0), Λ
∗(v) 6= ∅ and
〈σ〉x0 ∈ Λ
∗(x0).
Proof. Suppose that σ is an SPE in (X , x0) and let us prove by induction on k that for all
k ∈ N and all hv ∈ HistX(x0),
〈σ↾h〉v ∈ Λ
k(v).
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For case k = 0, this is true by definition of Λ0(v) and Lemma 14.
Suppose that this assertion is satisfied for k ≥ 0 and by contradiction, assume that there
exists hv ∈ HistX(x0) such that 〈σ↾h〉v 6∈ Λk+1(v). Let ρ = 〈σ↾h〉v, by Definition 11, it
means that there exist n ∈ N and i ∈ Π such that ρn ∈ Vi and
Costi(ρ≥n) > λ
k+1(ρn). (7)
But by induction hypothesis, we know that
Costi(ρ≥n) ≤ λ
k(ρn). (8)
It follows by (7) and (8) that λk+1(ρn) < λ
k(ρn) and that
λk+1(ρn) < +∞, λ
k(ρn) 6= 0 and λ
k+1(ρn) 6= 0.
In regards of Definition 15, these three relations allow us to conclude that
λk+1(ρn) = 1 + min
(ρn,v
′)∈EX
sup{Costi(ρ
′) | ρ′ ∈ Λk(v′)}.
Let v′ ∈ V be such that
λk+1(ρn)− 1 = sup{Costi(ρ
′) | ρ′ ∈ Λk(v′)}. (9)
Let h′ = hρ0 . . . ρn−1 ∈ HistX(x0), and let us define the one-shot deviating strategy τi from
σi↾h′ such that τi(ρn) = v
′. Let us prove that τi is a one-shot profitable deviation for player
i in (X ↾h′ , ρn).
Costi(h
′〈τi, σ−i|h′〉ρn) =
= Costi(h
′ρn〈σ↾h′ρn〉v′) (as τi is a one-shot deviating strategy)
= |h′ρnv
′|+Costi(〈σ↾h′ρn〉v′) (as λ
k+1(ρn) 6= 0)
≤ |h′ρnv
′|+ λk+1(ρn)− 1 (by (9) and as〈σ↾h′ρn〉v′ ∈ Λ
k(v′) by induction hypothesis)
< |h′ρn|+Costi(ρ≥n) (by (7))
= Costi(h
′〈σ↾h′〉ρn)
This proves that σ is not a very weak SPE and so not an SPE by Proposition 6, which is a
contradiction. This concludes the proof. ◭
◮ Proposition 24. Suppose that for all v ∈ Succ∗(x0), Λ∗(v) 6= ∅ and let ρ ∈ Λ∗(x0), then
ρ is the outcome of an SPE in (X , x0).
Proof. We show how to construct a very weak SPE σ (and so an SPE by Proposition 6)
with outcome ρ in (X , x0). We define σ step by step by induction on the subgames of (X , x0).
We first partially build σ such as it produces ρ, i.e., 〈σ〉x0 = ρ. Now, we define a set of plays
which will is useful to define σ in the subgames. For all (i, v′) such that (v, v′) ∈ EX with
v, v′ ∈ Succ∗(x0) and v ∈ V Xi , we define the play ρi,v
ρi,v′ = argmaxρ∈Λk∗ (v)(Costi(ρ)). (10)
Notice that such a play exists by Corollary 22. The construction of σ is done by induction
as follows. Consider hvv′ ∈ HistX(x0) with v ∈ V Xi such that 〈σ↾h〉v is already defined but
not yet 〈σ↾hv〉v′ . We extend the definition of σ as follows:
〈σ↾hv〉v′ = ρi,v′
Let us prove that σ is a very weak SPE. Consider the subgame (X ↾h, v) for a given hv ∈
HistX(x0) with v ∈ V Xi and the one-shot deviating strategy σ
′
i from σi|h such that σ
′
i(v) = v
′.
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By construction, there exists ρj,u and ρi,v′ as defined previously and g ∈ HistX(x0) such
that h〈σ↾h〉v = gρj,u and 〈σ↾hv〉v′ = ρi,v′ .
We have that ρ = 〈σ↾h〉v is suffix of ρj,u, that is, ρ = ρj,u,≥n for some n ∈ N and that
ρj,u ∈ Λk
∗
(u) = Λk
∗+1(u) (by (10) and the fixpoint). It follows that:
Costi(ρ) = Costi(ρj,u,≥n)
≤ λk
∗+1(v)
= 1 + min
(v,w)∈EX
sup{Costi(ρ
′) | ρ′ ∈ Λk
∗
(w)}
≤ 1 + sup{Costi(ρ
′) | ρ′ ∈ Λk
∗
(v′)}
= 1 + Costi(ρi,v′). (11)
We now prove that σ′i is not a one-shot profitable deviation by proving that Costi(h〈σ↾h〉v) ≤
Costi(hv〈σ↾hv〉v′). If i ∈ I(v), then obviously Costi(h〈σ↾h〉v) = Costi(hv〈σ↾hv〉v′ ) = 0. Oth-
erwise, i 6∈ I(v) and
Costi(h〈σ↾h〉v) = |hv|+Costi(ρ)
≤ |hv|+ 1 + Costi(ρi,v′) (by (11))
= Costi(hvρi,v′)
= Costi(hv〈σ↾hv〉v′).
This concludes the proof. ◭
◮ Example 25. Let us come back to the running example of Figure 2. The different steps
of Algorithm 1 are given in Table 1. The columns indicate the vertices according to their
region, respectively Π, {2}, and ∅. Notice that for the region Π, we only write one column
v as for all vertices (v,Π) the value of λ is equal to 0 all along the algorithm.
Recall that J1 = ∅ < J2 = {2} < J3 = Π = {1, 2}. The algorithm begins with the arena
XJ3. A fixpoint (λ1 = λ0) is immediately reached because all vertices belong to the target
set of both players in XJ3. Thus the first local fixpoint is reached with k∗3 = 0.
The algorithm then treats the arena X≥J2. By Lemma 18, it is enough to consider the
regionXJ2 . Let us explain how to compute λ2(v) from λ1(v) on this region. For v = (v7, {2}),
we have that λ2(v) = 1 +min(v,v′)∈EX sup{Cost1(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ
1(v′)} . As the unique successor
of v is (v2, {1, 2}), all λ1-consistent plays beginning in this successor have cost 0. So, we have
that λ2(v) = 1. For the computation of λ2(v6, {2}), the same argument holds since (v6, {2})
has the unique successor (v7, {2}). The vertex (v1, {2}) has two successors: (v6, {2}) and
(v3, {2}). Again, we know that all λ1-consistent plays beginning in (v6, {2}) have cost 2.
From (v3, {2}) however, one can easily check that the play (v3, {2})(v0, {2})((v4, {2}))ω is
λ1-consistent and has cost +∞ for player 1. Thus, we obtain that λ2(v1, {2}) = 3. For the
other vertices of XJ2 , one can see that λ2(v) = λ1(v).
Finally, we can check that the local fixed point is reached in the arenaX≥J2 (resp. X≥J1)
with λ3 = λ2 (resp. λ6 = λ5 = λ∗). Therefore the respective fixpoints are reached with
k∗2 = 2 and k
∗
1 = 5. The labeling function indicated in Figure 2 is the one of λ
∗. ◭
4 Counter graph
In the previous section, we have introduced the concept of labeling function λ and the
constraints that it imposes on plays. We have also proposed an algorithm that computes a
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Region {1, 2} {2} ∅
v v0 v1 v6 v7 v3 v4 v5 v0 v1 v6 v7 v3 v4
λ0 = λ1 0 0 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞
λ2 = λ3 0 0 3 2 1 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞
λ4 0 0 3 2 1 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ 3 2 1 +∞ +∞
λ5 = λ∗ 0 0 3 2 1 +∞ +∞ +∞ 4 3 2 1 +∞ +∞
Table 1 The different steps of the algorithm computing λ∗ for the extended game of Figure 2
sequence of labeling functions (λk)k∈N until reaching a fixpoint λ
∗ such that the plays that
are λ∗-consistent are exactly the SPE outcomes. In this section, given a labeling function λ,
we introduce the concept of counter graph such that its infinite paths coincide with the plays
that are λ-consistent. We then show that the counter graph associated with the fixpoint
function λ∗ has an exponential size, an essential step to prove PSPACE membership of the
constraint problem.
For the entire section, we fix a reachability game G = (G, (Fi)i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π) with an
arena G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E), and v0 be an initial vertex. Let X = (X, (FXi )i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π)
with the arena X = (Π, V X , (V Xi )i∈Π, E
X) be its associated extended game. Furthermore,
when we speak about a play ρ we always mean a play in the extended game X .
A labeling function λ give constraints on costs of plays from each vertex in X , albeit only
for the player that owns this vertex. However, by the property of λ-consistence, constraints
for a player carry over all the successive vertices, whether they belong to him or not. In order
to check efficiently this property, we introduce the counter graph to keep track explicitly of
the accumulation of constraints for all players at each step of a play. Let us first fix some
notation.
◮ Definition 26 (Restriction and maximal finite range). Let λ : V X → N∪{+∞} be a labeling
function.
We consider restrictions of λ to sub-arenas of V X as follows. Let n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we
denote by λn : V
Jn → N ∪ {+∞} the restriction of λ to V Jn. Similarly we denote by
λ≥n (resp. λ>n) the restriction of λ to V
≥Jn (resp. V >Jn).
The maximal finite range of λ, denoted by mR(λ), is equal to
mR(λ) = max{c ∈ N | λ(v) = c for some v ∈ V X}
with the convention that mR(λ) = 0 if λ is the constant function +∞. We also extend
this notion to restrictions of λ with the convention that mR(λ>n) = 0 if Jn is a bottom
region.
Notice that in the definition of maximal finite range, we only consider the finite values
of λ (and not the value +∞).
◮ Definition 27 (Counter Graph). Let λ : V X → N ∪ {+∞} be a labeling function.
Let K := {0, . . . ,K} ∪ {+∞} with K = mR(λ). The counter graph C(λ) for G and λ is
equal to C(λ) = (Π, V C , (V Ci )i∈Π, E
C), such that:
V C = V X ×K|Π|
(v, (ci)i∈Π) ∈ V Cj if and only if v ∈ V
X
j
((v, (ci)i∈Π), (v
′, (c′i)i∈Π)) ∈ E
C if and only if:
(v, v′) ∈ EX , and
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for every i ∈ Π
c′i =

0 if i ∈ I(v′)
ci − 1 if i /∈ I(v′), v′ /∈ V Xi and ci > 1
min(ci − 1, λ(v′)) if i /∈ I(v′), v′ ∈ V Xi and ci > 1.
Intuitively, the counter graph is constructed such that once a value λ(v) is finite for a
vertex v ∈ V Xi along a play in X , the corresponding path in C(λ) keeps track of the induced
constraint by (i) decrementing the counter value ci for the concerned player i by 1 at every
step, (ii) updating this counter if a stronger constraint for player i is encountered by visiting
a vertex v′ with a smaller value λ(v′), and (iii) setting the counter ci to 0 if player i has
reached his target set.
Note that in the counter graph, there may be some vertices with no outgoing edges. In-
deed, consider a vertex (v, (ci)i∈Π) ∈ V C such that cj = 1 for some player j. By construction
of C(λ), the only outgoing edges from (v, (ci)i∈Π) must link to vertices (v
′, (c′i)i∈Π) such that
(v, v′) ∈ EX , c′j = 0 and j ∈ I(v
′). However, it may be the case that no successor v′ of v in
X is such that j ∈ I(v′).
Note as well that for each vertex v ∈ V X , there exist many different vertices (v, (ci)i∈Π)
in C(λ), one for each counter values profile. However, the intended goal of the counter
graph is to monitor explicitly the constraints accumulated by each player along a play in X
regarding the function λ. Thus, we will only consider paths in C(λ) that start in vertices
(v, (ci)i∈Π) such that the counter values correspond indeed to the constraint at the beginning
of a play in X regarding λ:
◮ Definition 28 (Starting vertex in C(λ)). Let v ∈ V X . We distinguish one vertex vC =
(v, (ci)i∈Π) in V
C , such that for every i ∈ Π:
ci =

0 if i ∈ I(v)
λ(v) if i /∈ I(v) and v ∈ V Xi
+∞ otherwise.
We call vC the starting vertex associated with v, and denote by SV(λ) the set of all starting
vertices in C(λ).
◮ Example 29. Recall the extended game (X , x0) of Figure 2, and the labeling function λ
whose values are indicated under or next to each vertex. In Example 12, we have shown
that the play
ρ = (v0, ∅)(v1, ∅)(v6, ∅)(v7, ∅)((v2,Π)(v0,Π)(v1,Π)(v6,Π)(v7,Π))
ω
was λ-consistent. Let us show that there is a corresponding infinite path π that starts in
(v0, ∅)
C = (v0, ∅, (+∞, 4)) in C(λ). Following Definition 27, we see that in C(λ), there exists
an edge between (v0, ∅, (+∞, 4)) and (v1, ∅, (3, 3)) and that
π = (v0, ∅)
C(v1, ∅, (3, 3))(v6, ∅, (2, 2))(v7, ∅, (1, 1))π
′ω
with
π′ = (v2,Π, (0, 0))(v0,Π, (0, 0))(v1,Π, (0, 0))(v6,Π, (0, 0))(v7,Π, (0, 0)).
Recall now the play ρ′ = ((v0, ∅)(v4, ∅))ω described in Example 12, which is not λ-consistent.
From (v0, ∅)C = (v0, ∅, (+∞, 4)), there is an edge to (v4, ∅, (+∞, 3)), then to (v0, ∅, (+∞, 2))
18 The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games
and to (v4, ∅, (+∞, 1)). For the latter vertex, there is no outgoing edge back to (v0, ∅, (+∞, 0))
because 2 /∈ I(v0). Therefore there is no infinite path starting in (v0, ∅)C in C(λ) that cor-
responds to ρ′. ◭
There exists a correspondence between λ-consistent plays in X and infinite paths from
starting vertices in C(λ) in the following way. On one hand, every play ρ in X that is not
λ-consistent does not appear in the counter graph: the first constraint regarding λ that is
violated along ρ is reflected by a vertex in C(λ) with a counter value getting to 1 and no
outgoing edges. On the other hand, λ-consistent plays in X have a corresponding infinite
path in the counter graph C(λ). This correspondence is formalized in the two following
lemmas:
◮ Lemma 30. Let ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . be a λ-consistent play in PlaysX(v). Then there exists an
associated infinite path π = π0π1 . . . in C(λ) such that:
π0 = v
C ,
ρ is the projection of π on V X , that is, πn is of the form (v
′, (c′i)i∈Π) with v
′ = ρn, for
every n ∈ N.
Proof. Let v ∈ V X and k ∈ N. Let ρ be a play in X such that ρ ∈ Λ(v) and ρ0 = v. We
build the corresponding infinite path π in C(λ) iteratively as follows: Let π0 := v
C . Let
n ∈ N, n ≥ 1. Suppose that π<n has been already constructed, we show how to choose πn.
Suppose πn−1 = (v
′, (c′i)i∈Π). Then πn := (v
′′, (c′′i )i∈Π), where:
v′′ = ρn,
for every i ∈ Π:
c′′i =

0 if i ∈ I(v′′),
c′i − 1 if i /∈ I(v
′′) and v′′ /∈ V Xi ,
min(c′i − 1, λ(v
′′)) if i /∈ I(v′′) and v′′ ∈ V Xi
Let us show that ((v′, (c′i)i∈Π), (v
′′, (c′′i )i∈Π)) ∈ E
C :
As ρ is a play in X , we clearly have (v′, v′′) ∈ EX ,
Assume now, towards contradiction, that ((v′, (c′i)i∈Π), (v
′′, (c′′i )i∈Π)) /∈ E
C . Since
(v′, v′′) ∈ EX , it means that at least one counter value c′′i does not respect the con-
straints of the edge relation of C(λ). For every player i ∈ I(v′′), we have indeed
counter value c′′i at πn equal to 0, so the violation of the constraints must come
from a player i such that i /∈ I(v′′). Furthermore, if for every such player the
counter value c′i > 1, then by construction of C(λ) and definition of πn, we have
((v′, (c′i)i∈Π), (v
′′, (c′′i )i∈Π)) ∈ E
C . Thus, there exists a player i such that c′i = 1 (and
i /∈ I(v′′).
∗ if v′ ∈ V Xi and c
′
i = λ(v
′) = 1, then, since ρ is λ-consistent, player i sees his
objective along ρ in one step, that is at vertex v′′, and thus i ∈ I(v′′), which is a
contradiction.
∗ if v′ ∈ V Xi and λ(v
′) 6= 1, then it means that there exists an index m < n − 1
such that the vertex ρm ∈ V Xi and such that λ(ρm) = c
m with cm ∈ N \ {0} and
such that the counter value for player i decreases by exactly 1 at each step until
v′. Indeed, along ρ, at each vertex w owned by player i, the counter value is the
minimum of λ(w) and the counter value at the predecessor minus 1. Thus, there
must be before step n− 1 a last occurrence of the counter value being set to λ(w).
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Let w = ρm and d := λ(w). Since ρ is λ-consistent, player i sees his objective along
ρ in at most d steps, thus at most at vertex v′′, and thus i ∈ I(v′′), which is a
contradiction.
∗ finally, if c′i = 1 and v
′ /∈ V Xi , we are in a similar case: there exists an index m <
n− 1 such that the vertex ρm ∈ V Xi and such that λ(ρm) = c
m with cm ∈ N \ {0}
and such that the counter value for player i decreases by exactly 1 at each step until
v′. Let w = ρm and d := λ(w). Since ρ is λ-consistent, player i sees his objective
along ρ in at most d steps, thus at most at vertex v′′, and thus i ∈ I(v′′), which is
a contradiction.
◭
◮ Lemma 31. Let vC = (v, (ci)i∈Π) be a starting vertex in SV(λ). Let π = π0π1 . . . be an
infinite path in C(λ) such that π0 = v
C . Then there exists a corresponding play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . .
in X such that:
ρ is λ-consistent,
ρ is the projection of π on V X , that is, ρn = v
′ with πn = (v
′, (c′i)i∈Π), for every n ∈ N.
Proof. Let vC = (v, (ci)i∈Π) be a starting vertex in SV(λ). Let π be an infinite path in
C(λ) such that π0 = v
C . Let ρ be the projection of π on V X , that is, ρn = v
′ with
πn = (v
′, (c′i)i∈Π), for every n ∈ N.
Clearly, ρ is a play in X : by construction of C(λ), there exists an edge between two
vertices (v, (ci)i∈Π) and (v
′, (c′i)i∈Π) in C(λ) only if (v, v
′) is an edge in EX .
Furthermore, the play ρ is λ-consistent: Assume, towards contradiction, that it is not.
Thus, there exists n ∈ N and i ∈ Π such that ρn ∈ V Xi and Costi(ρ≥n) > λ(ρn). Consider
now πn and the value ci of the counter for player i at this vertex. Since ρn ∈ V Xi , we
know that ci ≤ λ(ρn). From this vertex, the counter value for player i decreases at least
by 1 at each step along π≥n. and hits the value 0 before λ(ρn) steps. However, this
means that in ρ≥n, player i sees his objective sooner than expected and the cost is less
than λ(ρn), which is a contradiction.
◭
Since the edge relation EC in the counter graph respects the edge relation EX in the
extended game, the region decomposition of a path in X given in Lemma 9 can also be
applied to a path in C(λ). We will often use such path region decompositions in the proofs
of this section.
In order to prove the PSPACE membership for the constraint problem, we need to show
that the counter graph C(λ∗), with λ∗ the fixpoint function computed by Algorithm 1,
has an exponential size. To this end it is enough to show an exponential upper bound on
the maximal finite range mR(λ∗) of λ∗. We proceed in two steps: First, with the next
proposition, given a labeling function λ and its restriction λ≥ℓ to V
≥ℓ, we exhibit a bound
on the supremum of the cost of λ-consistent plays for each player, in terms of the maximal
finite range mR(λ≥ℓ). Second, we consider the actual sequence of functions (λ
k)k∈N defined
in Definitions 13 and 15, as implemented by Algorithm 1. With Theorem 34, we show that
mR(λ∗) is bounded by an exponential in the size of the original game G. The proof is by
induction on k and uses Proposition 32.
◮ Proposition 32 (Bound on finite supremum). Let λ be a labeling function. Let v ∈ V X
such that I(v) = Jℓ with ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Suppose there exists c ∈ N such that sup {Costi(ρ) |
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ρ ∈ Λ(v)} = c. Then,
c ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj|=r
mR(λj)
Before proving Proposition 32, we need the following technical lemma:
◮ Lemma 33. Let vC be a starting vertex in SV(λ) associated with v ∈ V X such that
I(v) = Jℓ. Let π be a finite prefix of a valid path in C(λ) such that:
π0 = v
C ,
π does not contain any cycle.
Then,
|π| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj|=r
mR(λj)
Proof sketch. The proof of this lemma is quite technical, so we give here the main ideas
and refer to the full proof hereafter for more details.
Let π be a finite prefix of a valid path in C(λ) as in the statement. Let π[ℓ] . . . π[m] be its
region decomposition according to Lemma 9, graphically represented in Figure 3. Let ρ be
the corresponding path in X and ρ[ℓ] . . . ρ[m] be its region decomposition. Let us consider
a fixed non-empty section π[n].
π[ℓ]0
Jℓ
∞→ c
π[n]0
Jn
π[m]0
Jm
Figure 3 Region decomposition of pi
Suppose first that the counter values at π[n]0 are either 0 or +∞. Let us prove that
along π[n], there can be at most |V | steps before reaching a vertex with a finite positive
value of λ:
assume there is a cycle in the corresponding section ρ[n] in X such that from ρ[n]0 and
along the cycle, all the values of λ are either 0 or +∞,
by construction of C(λ), the counter values in the corresponding prefix of π[n] remain
fixed for each vertex of this prefix: as no value of λ is positive and finite, no counter
value can be decremented,
thus, the cycle in ρ[n] is also a cycle in π[n] which is impossible by hypothesis,
thus there is no such cycle in ρ[n], and as there are at most |V | vertices in region XJn ,
ρ[n] can have a prefix of length at most |V | with only values 0 or +∞ for λ, implying
that this is also the case for π[n].
Therefore, we can decompose π[n] into a (possibly empty) prefix of length at most |V |, and
a (possibly empty) suffix where at least one counter value c′i, for some i, is a positive finite
value in its first vertex v′. This frontier between prefix and suffix of π[n] is represented by a
vertical double bar ‖ with caption∞→ c in Figure 3. This value c′i is bounded by mR(λn),
the maximal finite range of λn. From there, as the corresponding ρ is λ-consistent, player i
reaches his target set in at most c′i steps, and ρ enters a new region, which means that the
section π[n] is over. So, in that case, the length of π[n] can be bounded by |V |+mR(λn).
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Suppose now that at vertex π[n]0, there exists a counter value ci for some player i that
is neither 0 nor +∞. This means that there was a constraint for player i initialized in a
previous section π[n′], with n′ < n, that has carried over to π[n]0, via decrements of at
least 1 per step. We know that the initial finite counter value is bounded by mR(λn′ ), and
appeared before the end of section π[n′]. Thus the length from the end of section π[n′] to
the end of section π[n] is bounded by mR(λn′ ), as again, once the counter value attains 0
for player i, the path π has entered the next section.
Therefore, considering the possible cases for each section, we can bound the total length
of π as follows:
|π| ≤
m∑
j=ℓ
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj).
Finally, remark that by I-monotonicity, it is actually the case that only (and at most)
|Π| different non-empty sections can appear in the decomposition of π. Furthermore, for
each n ∈ {ℓ+ 1, . . . , N}, we have
mR(λn) ≤ max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj |=|Jn|
mR(λj)
by Definition 26. Thus, we have the following bound:
|π| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj |=r
mR(λj)
which is the bound stated in Lemma 33. ◭
Proof of Lemma 33. Let vC be a starting vertex in SV(λ). Let π be a finite prefix of a
valid path in C(λ) such that:
π0 = v
C ,
π does not contain any cycle.
The following proof is quite technical, thus we alleviate some of the difficulties by proving
a first upper bound on the length of finite paths without cycles in C(λ), then by showing
how to obtain the desired bound. The main idea is to bound iteratively the length of prefixes
of π, adding at each step of the reasoning the section for the next region traversed by π.
Let π′ be a valid path in C(λ) such that π is a prefix of π′. By Lemma 9, we know that
there exist two natural numbers ℓ,m′ ≤ N and m′ − ℓ (possibly empty) paths π′ℓ, . . . , π′m
′
in C(λ) such that:
π′ = π′[ℓ] . . . π′[m′],
for each ℓ ≤ j ≤ m′, each vertex in π′[n] is of the form (w, (ci)i∈Π) with I(w) = Jj .
The finite path π is a finite prefix of π′. Thus there exists a natural number m ≤ m′ and
m− ℓ (possibly empty) paths π[ℓ], . . . , π[m′] in C(λ) such that:
π = π[ℓ] . . . π[m],
for each ℓ ≤ j < m, π[j] = π′[j],
π[m] if a finite prefix of π′[m].
By Lemma 31, there exist a corresponding λ-consistent play ρ′ in X and a corresponding
history ρ. Furthermore, since π contains no cycle, the sections π[n] do not either.
We first treat the case where m < m′.
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We first bound the length of the first section π[ℓ]. Recall that since π[ℓ]0 = v
C ∈ SV(λ),
we have that vC = (v, (ci)i∈Π) with ci = 0 if i ∈ Jℓ, ci = λ(v) if v ∈ Vi and ci = +∞
otherwise.
Suppose 0 < λ(v) < +∞. In that case, we know that along ρ′, which is λ-consistent,
player i reaches his target after at most λ(v) steps. Thus, there exists n ≤ m′, n 6= ℓ such
that I(ρλ(v)) = Jn, Jℓ ( Jn, and πλ(v) belongs to section π[n]. This means that section π[ℓ] is
shorter than λ(v). Since I(v) = Jℓ, we have that λ(v) ≤ mR(λℓ), and thus |π[ℓ]| ≤ mR(λℓ).
Suppose now that λ(v) = 0 or λ(v) = +∞. The counter values at vC are thus either 0
or +∞. Along π′, they can stay stable for at most |V | steps (see Proof sketch of Lemma 33.
Otherwise, the cycle induced in ρ′ is also a cycle in π′ as the counter values are fixed. If
π′|V |+1 is in section π
′[n] with n > ℓ, then we immediately get that |π[ℓ]| ≤ |V |. If π′|V |+1
is in section π′[ℓ], then it means that a counter value for some player i has become finite
along the first |V |+1 vertices of π′[ℓ]. Let t be the first index it does so along π′[ℓ]. By the
same argument as in the previous case, we know that from π′[ℓ]t, there is at most mR(λℓ)
vertices before entering the next section of π′. Thus, we obtain that:
|π[ℓ]| ≤ |π′[ℓ]|
≤ |V |+mR(λℓ)
≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ).
If ℓ = m, we can already conclude that:
|π| ≤ |π[ℓ]|
≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ)
≤
m∑
j=ℓ
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj).
Suppose now that ℓ < m. We show that for each n > ℓ, we have:
|π[ℓ] . . . π[n]| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+mR(λn).
Let n = ℓ + 1. We assume π[n] is not empty, otherwise its length is 0. Consider now
π[n]0.
Suppose there exists a player i such that his counter value ci at π[n]0 = (w, Jn, (ci)i∈Π) is
a finite non-zero value. If w 6∈ Vi, it means that the counter value has decreased since a vertex
(w′, (c′i)i∈Π) in the previous section π[ℓ] such that w
′ ∈ Vi and c′i = λ(w). Thus, the length
of the path from this vertex (w′, (c′i)i∈Π) to the next section π[n+ 1] is smaller or equal than
λ(w′). In particular, the whole section π[n] is “covered" by this path. Therefore, we can
conclude that |π[n]| ≤ λ(w′) ≤ mR(λℓ). Since we already know that |π[ℓ]| ≤ |V |+mR(λℓ),
we obtain that:
|π[ℓ]π[n]| ≤ |V |+mR(λℓ) + mR(λℓ)
≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ).
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If w ∈ Vi, it means that either the counter value ci is equal to λ(w) or has decreased since
a vertex (w′, (c′i)i∈Π) in the previous section π[ℓ] such that w
′ ∈ Vi and c′i = λ(w
′). Thus, we
have that ci ≤ mR(λn) or ci ≤ mR(λℓ), and, in turn, |π[n]| ≤ mR(λn) or |π[n]| ≤ mR(λn).
Therefore, we can conclude that:
|π[ℓ]π[n]| ≤ |V |+mR(λℓ) + mR(λℓ) + mR(λn)
≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) + mR(λn).
Suppose now that for every player i, his counter value ci at π[n]0 = (w, (ci)i∈Π) is either
0 or +∞. In that case, we are in a similar case than for section π[ℓ], thus we can conclude
that |π[n]| ≤ |v|+mR(λn). Thus, we have indeed:
|π[ℓ]π[n]| ≤ |V |+mR(λℓ) + |V |+mR(λn),
and also
|π[ℓ]π[n]| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) + |V |+mR(λn).
If m = ℓ+ 1, we are done.
Suppose now that m > ℓ+ 1. Let n be such that ℓ+ 1 < n ≤ m. Assume that for each
n′ < n, it holds that
|π[ℓ] . . . π[n′]| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n′−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+mR(λn′).
We assume π[n] is not empty, otherwise its length is 0. Consider now π[n]0.
Suppose there exists a player i such that his counter value ci at π[n]0 = (w, (ci)i∈Π) is
a finite non-zero value. If w 6∈ Vi, it means that the counter value has decreased since a
vertex (w′, (c′i)i∈Π) in a previous section π[n
′] such that w′ ∈ Vi and c′i = λ(w
′). Thus, the
length of the path from this vertex (w′, (c′i)i∈Π) to the next section π[n+ 1] is smaller or
equal than λ(w′). In particular, the whole sections from π[n′ + 1] to π[n] are “covered" by
this path. Therefore, we can conclude that |π[n′ + 1] . . . π[n]| ≤ λ(w′) ≤ mR(λn′). Since we
already know that:
|π[ℓ] . . . π[n′]| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n′−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+mR(λn′),
we obtain that:
|π[ℓ] . . . π[n]| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n′−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+mR(λn′) + mR(λn′)
≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n′−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λn′ )
≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+mR(λn).
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If w ∈ Vi, it means that either the counter value ci is equal to λ(w) or has decreased since
a vertex (w′, (c′i)i∈Π) in a previous section π[n
′] such that w′ ∈ Vi and c′i = λ(w
′). Thus, we
have that ci ≤ mR(λn) or ci ≤ mR(λn′), and, in turn, |π[n]| ≤ mR(λn) or |π[n]| ≤ mR(λn′).
If |π[n]| ≤ mR(λn), we can conclude that:
|π[ℓ] . . . π[n]| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+mR(λn)
≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+mR(λn).
If |π[n]| ≤ mR(λn′), we can conclude that:
|π[ℓ] . . . π[n]| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n′−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+mR(λn′ ) + mR(λn′)
≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+mR(λn).
Suppose now that for every player i, his counter value ci at π[n]0 = (w, (ci)i∈Π) is either
0 or +∞. In that case, we are in a similar case than for section π[ℓ], thus we can conclude
that |π[n]| ≤ |v|+mR(λn). Thus, we have indeed:
|π[ℓ] . . . π[n]| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 n−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |+mR(λn)
and thus finally:
|π| ≤ |π[ℓ] . . . π[m]| ≤
m∑
j=ℓ
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj).
Assume now that m = m′. In that case, we cannot rely on the section π′m to be finite,
as the play ρ′ never reaches another region. However, in this situation, it is guaranteed that
the counter values in π′m are fixed and are equal to either 0 or +∞: indeed, a finite counter
value would imply that some player i such that i 6∈ Jm reaches his target in ρ
′ exactly when
his counter value becomes 0 in π′. But π′m is the last section of ρ′, thus no new region is
reached after Jm and no new player can see his objective than the players i ∈ Jm. Therefore,
finite prefix of π′m that contains no cycle has its length bounded by |V |. Thus, we can
conclude:
|π| = |π[ℓ] . . . π[m]|
≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
 m−1∑
j=ℓ+1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj)
+ |V |
≤
m∑
j=ℓ
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λj).
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In fact, the bound given above can be slightly changed to give the desired bound. In-
deed, the bound above relies on the fact that m ≤ N and covers the case where a path
traverses every region from Jℓ to JN . In all generality, the number N of different regions
can be exponential in the number |Π| of players. However, by the I-monotonicity property,
we know that a path can actually traverse at most |Π| regions. Thus, in the region decom-
position of a path, only (and at most) |π| sections are relevant and of length greater than 0.
Therefore, we can define a subsequence of indices (nr)r≤|π|, with n1 = ℓ, such that in fact
π = π[n1] . . . π[n|Π|]. Hence, we obtain the following bound on the length t of π:
t ≤
|Π|∑
r=1
|V |+ 2 ·mR(λnr )
Finally, as for every r ≤ |π|, r > 1, we have mR(λnr ) ≤ max{mR(λj) | Jj > Jℓ, |Jj | =
|Jnr |}, we obtain the desired bound:
t ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj|=r
mR(λj)
.
◭
We are now ready to prove Proposition 32.
Proof of Proposition 32. Let v ∈ V X with I(v) = Jℓ and i ∈ Π be such that there exists
c ∈ N with sup {Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ(v)} = c.
If i ∈ Jℓ, then c = 0, as every play starting in v has a cost 0 for player i. Hence the
statement of Proposition 32 trivially holds.
Suppose now that i /∈ Jℓ. Consider ρ ∈ Λk(v) such that Costi(ρ) = c < +∞. As player i
eventually reaches his target set along ρ, this means that ρ eventually leaves region Jℓ and
eventually reaches another region Jn such that i ∈ Jn. Consider the prefix ρ≤c of ρ of length
c. Let π := π[ℓ] . . . π[m] be the associated path and region decomposition of ρ≤c in C(λ).
Notice that π[m] consists only of one vertex corresponding to ρc, and that for every n < m,
we have i /∈ Jn.
Suppose that π contains a cycle. By construction of C(λ), this cycle is included in one
single section π[n], where n < m (as π[m] contains only one vertex), and thus i /∈ Jn.
Consider the infinite path π′ in C(λ) that follows π until the cycle and then repeats the
cycle forever. By Lemma 31, there exists a corresponding λ-consistent play ρ′ in X . We
have Costi(ρ
′) = +∞ for player i, as ρ′ never reaches a region where player i reaches his
target set. This is a contradiction with the fact that sup {Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ(v)} = c is finite.
Therefore π contains no cycle, and by Lemma 33,
|π| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λℓ) +
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj |=r
mR(λj)
Since |π| = c = Costi(ρ), we obtain the statement of Proposition 32. ◭
We now come back to the labeling functions (λk)k∈N computed by Algorithm 1. Recall
that this algorithm works in a bottom-up manner (see Proposition 17): it first computes
the local fixpoint λk
∗
N on region V JN , then the local fixpoint λk
∗
N−1 on V ≥JN−1, . . . , until
finally computing the global fixpoint λ∗ on V ≥J1 = V X . Recall also that when the algorithm
26 The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games
computes the local fixpoint in the arena X≥Jn , the values of λk(v) may only change in the
region V Jn (Lemma 18). We are now ready to show an exponential bound (in the size of
G) on the maximal finite ranges mR(λ
k∗ℓ
ℓ ) for each region X
Jℓ and mR(λ
k∗ℓ
≥ℓ) for each arena
X≥Jℓ . With ℓ = 1, we get that mR(λ∗) is of exponential size, and thus also the size of the
counter graph.
◮ Theorem 34 (Bound on maximal finite range). For each ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we have
mR(λ
k∗ℓ
ℓ ) ≤ O(|V |
(|V |+3)·(|Π\Jℓ|+2))
and also:
mR(λ
k∗ℓ
≥ℓ) ≤ O(|V |
(|V |+3)·(|Π|+2)).
In particular for the global fixpoint λ∗ we have
mR(λ∗) ≤ O(|V |(|V |+3)·(|Π|+2)).
Proof. The proof is done by a double induction: First, we exploit the fact that Algorithm 1
treats every region one after the other, following the total order on regions in reverse. That
is, to compute the values of the fixpoint function λk∗ over V X , Algorithm 1 computes first
the values of λk∗ on region V JN , then on region V JN−1 etc. . . until finally on region V J1 .
Thus, we follow this order to prove the local bounds on mR(λ
k∗ℓ
ℓ ), starting by mR(λ
k∗N
N ) and
making our way up to mR(λ
k∗1
1 ), assuming for each region V
Jℓ such that ℓ < N that the
bound is true for every region already treated by Algorithm 1. Second, given a non-bottom
region V Jℓ and assuming the bound is true for every already treated region, we proceed to
show the local bound for V Jℓ by induction on the number k of steps in the computation,
which corresponds to the values of function λk in the sequence of functions leading to the
fixpoint, up to step k∗ℓ , where the values stabilize on region V
ℓ.
Let us now detail the proof. It is structured into several parts.
Part 1. We begin with some notations and basic properties. We introduce a useful
notation: for each ℓ < N and each k ∈ N, we define α(λk, ℓ) as follows3:
α(λk, ℓ) :=
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj |=r
mR(λkj )
Let ℓ ≤ N and v ∈ V Jℓ . By Lemma 18, we know the following:
1. the values of λk+1ℓ (v) and λ
k
ℓ (v) may differ only when k
∗
ℓ+1 < k < k
∗
ℓ ;
2. for k ≤ k∗ℓ+1, we have λ
k
ℓ (v) = λ
k+1
ℓ (v) = λ
0
ℓ (v);
3. for k ≥ k∗ℓ , we have λ
k
ℓ (v) = λ
k+1
ℓ (v) = λ
k∗ℓ (v)
By 3., we have that for each ℓ < N , and for k ≥ k∗ℓ+1, we have mR(λ
k
ℓ+1) = mR(λ
k∗ℓ+1
ℓ+1 ).
Thus, for k ≥ k∗ℓ+1, we also have
α(λk, ℓ) = α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ). (12)
Part 2. Let ℓ < N and assume Jℓ is not a bottom region. We start by proving, this time
by induction on the number k of algorithm steps, a bound on mR(λkℓ ). Note, by Lemma 18
3 This sum appears in the statement of Proposition 32.
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recalled above, that the only relevant steps for region Jℓ are the steps k, where k
∗
ℓ+1 ≤ k ≤ k
∗
ℓ .
Let us show, for each such k, that:
mR(λkℓ ) ≤
|Dom(λkℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)) (13)
where Dom(λkℓ ) = {v ∈ V
Jℓ | λkℓ (v) 6= 0, λ
k
ℓ (v) 6= +∞}.
Base case: Assume k = k∗ℓ+1. By Lemma 18, we know that λ
k
ℓ = λ
0
ℓ . Thus, mR(λ
k
ℓ ) =
mR(λ0ℓ ) = 0. Furthermore, Dom(λ
k
ℓ ) = Dom(λ
0
ℓ ) = ∅, thus
∑|Dom(λkℓ )|
i=0 2
i = 1. Clearly,
Equation (13) is satisfied.
General case: Let now k be such that k∗ℓ+1 ≤ k < k
∗
ℓ . Assume that Equation (13) holds
for k. Let us show that
mR(λk+1ℓ ) ≤
|Dom(λk+1ℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)) (14)
We distinguish two subcases: (a) when Dom(λk+1ℓ ) = Dom(λ
k
ℓ ), and (b) when Dom(λ
k+1
ℓ ) 6=
Dom(λkℓ ).
(a) Assume Dom(λk+1ℓ ) = Dom(λ
k
ℓ ). We know by Lemma 19 that for each v ∈ V
Jℓ ,
λk+1ℓ (v) ≤ λ
k
ℓ (v). Thus in the considered case we have:
mR(λk+1ℓ ) ≤ mR(λ
k
ℓ )
≤
|Dom(λkℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)) by induction hyp. (13)
≤
|Dom(λk+1ℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)) by (a)
That is, Equation (14) holds.
(b) Assume Dom(λk+1ℓ ) 6= Dom(λ
k
ℓ ). Either we have mR(λ
k+1
ℓ ) ≤ mR(λ
k
ℓ ), and we can
proceed as in subcase (a), or we know that there exists v ∈ V Jℓ such that λkℓ (v) = +∞
and λk+1ℓ (v) < +∞. Recall that by Definition 15 we have that
λk+1ℓ (v) = 1 + min
(v,v′)∈EX
sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ
k(v′)} (15)
Since λk+1ℓ (v) 6= +∞, we know that sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ
k(v′)} is finite, for at least
one successor v′ of v. Thus, by Proposition 32, we obtain:
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λk+1ℓ (v) ≤ 1 + |V |+ 2 ·mR(λ
k
ℓ ) + α(λ
k, ℓ)
≤ 1 + |V |+ 2 ·mR(λkℓ ) + α(λ
k∗ℓ+1 , ℓ) by (12)
≤ 1 + |V |+ α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ)
+ 2 ·
|Dom(λkℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)) by ind. hyp.(13)
≤
2 ·
|Dom(λkℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
+ 1
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ))
Since Dom(λk+1ℓ ) 6= Dom(λ
k
ℓ ) by (b) (thus indeed |Dom(λ
k+1
ℓ )| > |Dom(λ
k
ℓ )|), we have2 ·
|Dom(λkℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
+ 1
 ≤
|Dom(λk+1ℓ )|∑
i=0
2i

.
Hence, we have
λk+1ℓ (v) ≤
|Dom(λk+1ℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ))
Finally, as this holds for any such v ∈ V Jℓ , we obtain
mR(λk+1ℓ ) ≤
|Dom(λk+1ℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ))
That is, Equation (14) holds for region Jℓ.
We proved that Equation (13) holds for each non-bottom region Jℓ and each step k such
that k∗ℓ+1 ≤ k ≤ k
∗
ℓ .
Part 3. We can now come back to the induction on the regions Jℓ, following the order
provided by Algorithm 1. Let us show that each ℓ ≤ N , we have
mR(λ
k∗ℓ
ℓ ) ≤ 2
(|V |+1) · (|Π||V |+ |V |+ 1) ·
|Π\Jℓ|∑
i=0
2(|V |+1) · 2|Π| (16)
Base case: If Jℓ is a bottom region, we have that mR(λ
k∗ℓ
ℓ ) = 0 showing that (16) holds
in this case and thus in particular when ℓ = N .
General case: Let ℓ < N and suppose Jℓ is not a bottom region. Assume that, for each
j > ℓ, Inequality (16) holds. By (13), we know that
mR(λkℓ ) ≤
|Dom(λkℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)).
Furthermore, as |Dom(λ
k∗ℓ
ℓ )| ≤ |V |, we have
mR(λkℓ ) ≤ 2
(|V |+1) · (1 + |V |+ α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ)) (17)
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We turn now our attention towards the term α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ):
α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ) =
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj |=r
mR(λ
k∗ℓ+1
j ) by Definition
=
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj |=r
mR(λ
k∗j
j ) by Lemma 18
By the induction hypothesis (16), we can bound each term mR(λ
k∗j
j ) appearing in the
above sum:
mR(λ
k∗j
j ) ≤ 2
(|V |+1) · (|Π||V |+ |V |+ 1) ·
|Π\Jj |∑
i=0
2(|V |+1) · 2|Π|
≤ 2(|V |+1) · (|Π||V |+ |V |+ 1) ·
|Π\Jℓ|−1∑
i=0
2(|V |+1) · 2|Π| as |Jj | > |Jℓ|.
Coming back to α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ) whose the number of terms in the sum can be bounded by
|Π|, we get
α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ) =
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj |=r
mR(λ
k∗ℓ+1
j )
≤ |Π||V |+ 2|Π|
2(|V |+1) · (|Π||V |+ |V |+ 1) · |Π\Jℓ|−1∑
i=0
2(|V |+1) · 2|Π|
 .
(18)
Hence we have, by combining (18) and (17):
mR(λ
k∗ℓ
ℓ ) ≤ 2
(|V |+1) · (1 + |V |+ α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ))
≤ 2(|V |+1) · (1 + |V |+ |Π||V |)
+ 2(|V |+1) · 2|Π|
2(|V |+1) · (|Π||V |+ |V |+ 1) · |Π\Jℓ|−1∑
i=0
2(|V |+1) · 2|Π|

≤ 2(|V |+1) · (1 + |V |+ |Π||V |) ·
1 + 2(|V |+1) · 2|Π|
|Π\Jℓ|−1∑
i=0
2(|V |+1) · 2|Π|

≤ 2(|V |+1) · (1 + |V |+ |Π||V |) ·
|Π\Jℓ|∑
i=0
2(|V |+1) · 2|Π|
 .
Hence, Equation (16) holds for region Jℓ.
Part 4. We can now prove the three statements of Theorem 34. We obtain the first one
from Inequality (16) by recalling that |Π| ≤ |V | and |V | ≥ 2:
30 The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games
mR(λ
k∗ℓ
ℓ ) ≤ 2
(|V |+1) · (1 + |V |+ |Π||V |) ·
|Π\Jℓ|∑
i=0
2(|V |+1) · 2|Π|

≤ |V |(|V |+1) · (1 + |V |+ |V |2) ·
|Π\Jℓ|∑
i=0
|V |(|V |+3)

≤ |V |(|V |+1) · (1 + |V |+ |V |2) · (|V |(|V |+3))(|Π\Jℓ|+1)
≤ O(|V |(|V |+3)) · (|V |(|V |+3))(|Π\Jℓ|+1)
≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3|)(|Π\Jℓ|+2)
)
(19)
This proves the first statement of Theorem 34.
For the second one, remark that mR(λ
k∗ℓ
≥ℓ) = max{mR(λ
k∗j
j ) | Jj ≥ Jℓ} (since only regions
already treated are considered). For each such j ≥ ℓ, we have mR(λ
k∗j
j ) ≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3|)(|Π\Jj|+2)
)
by (19) and thus mR(λ
k∗j
j ) ≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3|)(|Π|+2)
)
. It follows that mR(λ
k∗ℓ
≥ℓ) ≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3|)(|Π|+2)
)
.
For the last statement, recall that mR(λ∗) = mR(λ
k∗1
≥1). Hence in particular we obtain
mR(λ∗) ≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3|)(|Π|+2)
)
.
◭
The next corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 34.
◮ Corollary 35. The counter graph C(λ∗) has a size |C(λ∗)| exponential in the size of the
game G.
We conclude this section with two other corollaries that will be useful in the next section.
◮ Corollary 36. For every k ∈ N and region V Jℓ , we have
mR(λkℓ ) ≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3)(|Π|+2)
)
and also
mR(λk≥ℓ) ≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3)(|Π|+2)
)
.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that Jℓ is not a bottom region (otherwise we
immediately have mR(λkℓ ) = 0 for every k ∈ N). Let k ∈ N. Again, by Lemma 18, if
k ≤ k∗ℓ+1, we already have mR(λ
k
ℓ ) = 0, and if k ≥ k
∗
ℓ , we have λ
k
ℓ (v) = λ
k∗ℓ (v). Thus we
assume that k∗ℓ+1 < k ≤ k
∗
ℓ . Using the terminology of the proof of Theorem 34, we know,
by (13) in its proof, that
mR(λkℓ ) ≤
|Dom(λkℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)) (20)
As |Dom(λkℓ )| ≤ |V |, we have
mR(λkℓ ) ≤ 2
|V |+1 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ)) (21)
From there, following the same steps (from Equation (17) onwards) as in the proof of
Theorem 34 leads to the desired bound: mR(λkℓ ) ≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3)(|Π|+2)
)
.
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Similarly, as mR(λk≥ℓ) = max{mR(λ
k
j ) | j ≥ ℓ}, and as we just showed that mR(λ
k
j ) ≤
O
(
|V |(|V |+3|)(|Π|+2)
)
for every j and k, we immediately get mR(λk≥ℓ) ≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3|)(|Π|+2)
)
.
◭
◮ Corollary 37. Let v ∈ V X with I(v) = Jℓ with ℓ ≤ N . Let k ∈ N such that k > k∗ℓ+1.
Suppose there exists c ∈ N such that sup {Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v)} = c. Then, the following
holds:
c ≤ O
(
|V |(|V |+3|)(|Π|+2)
)
.
Proof. Let v ∈ V X with I(v) = Jℓ and k ∈ N. Suppose there exists c ∈ N such that
sup {Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v)} = c. If Jℓ is a bottom region, then c = 0, thus we assume from
now on that Jℓ is not a bottom region. Then, by Proposition 32, we know that:
c ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λkℓ ) +
|Π|∑
r=|Jℓ|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj>Jℓ
|Jj|=r
mR(λ
k∗j
j ).
Using the terminology of the proof of Theorem 34, we have:
c ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λkℓ ) + α(λ
k∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)
≤ 1 + |V |+ 2 ·mR(λkℓ ) + α(λ
k∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)
≤ 1 + |V |+ α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ) + 2 ·
|Dom(λkℓ )|∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ)) by (13)
≤
|Dom(λkℓ )|+1∑
i=0
2i
 · (1 + |V |+ α(λk∗ℓ+1 , ℓ))
As |Dom(λkℓ )| ≤ |V |, we obtain:
c ≤ 2 ·
[
2(|V |+1) · (1 + |V |+ α(λk
∗
ℓ+1 , ℓ))
]
.
From there, following the same steps (from Equation (17) onwards) as in the proof of
Theorem 34 leads to the desired bound:
c ≤ 2 · O
(
|V |(|V |+3)(|Π|+2)
)
= O
(
|V |(|V |+3)(|Π|+2)
)
.
◭
5 PSPACE completeness
In this section, we prove Theorem 4. We first prove that the constraint problem is in
PSPACE and then that it is PSPACE-hard.
5.1 PSPACE easyness
The purpose of this section is to prove that determining if, given a reachability game (G,v0)
and two thresholds x, y ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})|Π|, there exists an SPE σ in this game such that for
all i ∈ Π, xi ≤ Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ yi can be done in PSPACE (see Theorem 4).
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◮ Proposition 38. The constraint problem for quantitative reachability games is in PSPACE.
Let us provide a high level sketch of the proof of our PSPACE procedure for this con-
straint problem. Thanks to Theorem 20, solving the constraint problem reduced in finding
a λ∗-consistent play ρ in (X , x0) satisfying the constraints. By Lemmas 30 and 31, the
latter problem reduces in finding a valid path ρC in the counter graph C(λ∗), satisfying the
constraints. Roughly speaking, in order to solve our initial problem, it suffices to decide the
existence of a valid path that is a lasso and satisfies the constraints in the counter graph,
which is exponential in the size of our original input (by Corollary 35). Classical arguments,
using Savitch’s Theorem can thus be used to prove the PSPACE membership. Nevertheless,
the detailed proof is more intricate for two reasons. The first reason is that the counter
graph is based on the labeling function λ∗. We thus also have to prove that the labeling
function λ∗ can be computed in PSPACE. The second reason is that, a priori, although we
know that the counter graph is of exponential size, we do not know explicitly its size. This
is problematic when using classical NPSPACE algorithms that guess some path in a graph
of exponential size, where a counter bounded by the size of the graph is needed to guaran-
tee the termination of the procedure. In order to overcome this, we also need a PSPACE
procedure to obtain the actual size of the counter graph.
The whole procedure works by induction on k, the steps in the computation of the
labeling function λ∗. Moreover, it exploits the structural evolution of the local fixpoints
formalized in Proposition 17 and especially in Lemma 18. Let XJℓ be a region, we aim at
proving that λk+1(v) is computable in PSPACE for each v ∈ V Jℓ . Let k∗ℓ (resp. k
∗
ℓ+1) be
the step where the fixpoint is reached for region XJℓ (resp. XJℓ+1). Recall that k∗ℓ+1 < k
∗
ℓ .
When k ≤ k∗ℓ+1 (resp. k > k
∗
ℓ ), we have that λ
k+1(v) = λk(v) , for each v ∈ V Jℓ , by
Lemma 18. The tricky case in when k∗ℓ+1 < k ≤ k
∗
ℓ . (Notice the little difference with the
inequalities given in Lemma 18. When k = k∗ℓ , we still need to compute λ
k+1 to realize that
the fixpoint is effectively reached.)
In the latter case, the computation of λk+1(v) from λk(v), for all v ∈ V Jn , relies on the
maximum of the cost of the λk-consistent plays (see Definition 15). The latter quantity can
be bounded, once the size of of the counter graph C(λk≥ℓ) is known explicitly. Note that the
counter graph C(λk≥ℓ) has a size |C(λ
k
≥ℓ)| equal to |V | ·2
|Π| · (K +1)|Π| where K = mR(λk≥ℓ).
Hence to know its size, we have to to compute a bound onK. Under the induction hypothesis
that (i) {λk(v) | v ∈ V J
′
with J ′ ≥ Jℓ} , (ii) the maximum of the cost of the λk-consistent
plays starting in a successor of v ∈ V J
′
, with J ′ ≥ Jℓ, and (iii) the size of C(λk≥ℓ) can be
computed in PSPACE, we manage to prove that λk+1(v) is indeed computable in PSPACE
for each v ∈ V Jℓ . The correctness of the approach relies on Proposition 17 which ensures
that the values of λ∗ have already reached a fixpoint for all the v ∈ V J
′
such that J ′ > Jℓ.
Let us state and prove Proposition 39
◮ Proposition 39. Given a quantitative game (G, v0), for all k ∈ N, for all Jℓ ∈ I (for some
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N}), the set {λk(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ} and the maximal finite range mR(λk≥ℓ) can be
computed in PSPACE.
We proceed by induction on the step k ∈ N of the algorithm and, once a step is fixed,
we proceed region by region, beginning with the bottom region JN and then proceeding
bottom-up by following the total order on I.
In the following proof„ we have to deal with regions of the form XJ but we only have
the game G in input. Clearly, as there are at most |V | vertices of the form (v, J) we can
recover and encode the arena XJ in polynomial size memory.
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Proof of Proposition 39. We proceed by induction on k ∈ N.
For k = 0, we have to prove that for all Jℓ ∈ I (for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N}): {λk(v) | v ∈
V Jℓ} and mR(λk≥ℓ) can be both computed in PSPACE. Let Jℓ ∈ I, thanks to Definition 13,
we have that either λ0(v) = 0 if v ∈ Vi and i ∈ Jℓ or λ0(v) = +∞ otherwise. So, we only
have to check if i ∈ Jℓ and this can be done in PSPACE. Finally, mR(λ0≥l) = 0 because we
are at the initial step.
Now, assume that for all 0 ≤ n ≤ k, for all Jℓ ∈ I (for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N}) the set
{λn(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ} and the value mR(λn≥ℓ) can be computed in PSPACE. And we prove that
it remains true for n = k + 1.
We proceed by induction on the region XJℓ . If Jℓ = JN , then it is a bottom region.
Then for all v ∈ V JN , λk+1(v) = λ0(v) and so {λk+1(v) | v ∈ V JN} = {λ0(v) | v ∈ V JN}
(local fixpoint k∗N = 0 in Proposition 17), and we know that this latter set can be computed
in PSPACE. Moreover, as JN is a bottom region, we have that mR(λ
k+1
≥N ) = mR(λ
k+1
N ) = 0.
Now, let Jℓ ∈ I be a region different of JN . If it is a bottom region, the previous
arguments hold. Otherwise, we assume that we know (i) {λk(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ}, and we can store
it in polynomial size memory (ii) by induction hypothesis, we can compute {λk(v) | v ∈ V J
′
},
for all J ′ ≥ Jℓ, and mR(λk≥ℓ) in PSPACE (see Figure 4) and we prove that we can compute
{λk+1(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ} and mR(λk+1≥ℓ ) in PSPACE (22)
First, let us recall that thanks to Proposition 17, we know that Algorithm 1 reaches for each
region a local fixpoint. We denote by k∗ℓ (resp. k
∗
ℓ+1), the step after which the region X
Jℓ
(resp. XJℓ+1) has reached its fixpoint. Moreover, we know that k∗ℓ+1 < k
∗
ℓ .
If k ≤ k∗ℓ+1, then by Proposition 17 the region Jℓ+1 has not reached his local fixpoint yet.
So, it implies that the values of the vertices in Jℓ have not change since initialization (see
Lemma 18). More formally, for all v ∈ V Jℓ , either λk+1(v) = 0 if i ∈ Jℓ or λk+1(v) = +∞
otherwise. So {λk+1(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ} can be computed and stored in polynomial size memory.
It remains to prove that mR(λk+1≥ℓ ) can be computed in PSPACE. Clearly we have that
mR(λk+1ℓ ) = 0 and we can compute mR(λ
k+1
>ℓ ) = mR(λ
k+1
≥ℓ+1) in PSPACE by induction
hypothesis and this value is at most exponential in the size of the input (by Corollary 36).
So, as mR(λk+1≥ℓ ) = max(mR(λ
k+1
ℓ ),mR(λ
k+1
>ℓ )), assertion (22) is proved.
If k∗ℓ+1 < k ≤ k
∗
ℓ , the step k+1 of the iterative computation of the operator λ corresponds
to a step during which the value of λ for the vertices in V Jℓ can change or if k = k∗ℓ we
realize that the fixpoint is effectively reached. The fixed point is reached for all the regions
J ′ > Jℓ and is not reached yet for Jℓ. This is the most difficult case of this induction.
For all v ∈ V Jℓ , if v ∈ Vi, then, by definition, λ
k+1(v) is either equal to 0 (if i ∈ Jℓ) or
depends on the computation of sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v′)} with v′ ∈ Succ(v). We know by
Corollary 36 that for all v ∈ V Jℓ the value λk+1 is at most exponential in the size of the
input. It remains to prove that sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v′)} can be computed in PSPACE.
In order to prove this we need to guess lassoes of length at most 2 · |C(λk≥ℓ)| such that
|C(λk≥ℓ)| = (|V | · 2
|V | · (K + 1)|Π|) where K = mR(λk≥ℓ). (Because a path beginning in X
Jℓ
will only reach vertices in X≥Jℓ so we only have to consider the part of the counter graph
which correspond to X≥Jℓ .) We know by induction hypothesis that we can compute K in
PSPACE and that its value is at most exponential in the size of the input (Corollary 36),
so we can encode K with a polynomial space memory.
We proceed as follows: first recall by Corollary 22 thatM = sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v)} =
max{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v)}. We guess this valueM , for which we know that eitherM = +∞
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or M = c < +∞. We first test if M = +∞, and then if M = c.
IfM = +∞: by Proposition 21, we can find a lasso π = hgω of length at most 2 · |C(λk≥ℓ)|
in C(λk≥ℓ) such that if ρ
X is the corresponding λk-consistent play in the extended game,
then Costi(ρ) = +∞. To guess π we need to know the values of λk for all vertices v ∈
X≥Jℓ . It is not possible to maintain all these values in memory because there is maybe
an exponential number of them. So, we have to proceed in a smarter way. We know by
Lemma 9 that π can be decomposed according to the regions, i.e., π = π[ℓ]π[ℓ+1] . . . π[t]
for some t ∈ {ℓ, . . . , N}, where possibly some sections are empty. So, we first guess the
first vertex of g, the vertex on which there will be a cycle. And then we guess successively
π[ℓ], π[ℓ + 1] and so on. Additionally, we keep a counter CL (which is initialized to 0
and incremented by 1 each time we guess a new vertex of π) and a counter CT (which is
equal to 0 as long as player i does not reach his target set and is equal to 1 after that).
To guess a vertex (v′, Jm, (c
′
i)i∈Π) of π[m] with ℓ ≤ m ≤ t, assuming π[m] is not empty,
we only have to keep in memory its predecessor (v, Jn, (ci)i∈Π) (with n ≤ m) and to
know the value of λk(v′, Jm). If Jm = Jℓ it is done because we have {λ
k(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ}
in memory. Otherwise, by induction hypothesis, we can compute {λk(u) | u ∈ V Jm} in
PSPACE. Once π[m] is guessed we can forget {λk(u) | u ∈ V Jm}.
We stop if we have found the lasso or if CL = 2 · |C(λk≥ℓ)| + 1. If CL ≤ 2 · |C(λ
k
≥ℓ)| and
CT = 0, we have found a good lasso i.e., one such that player i does not reach his target
set along its corresponding play in the extended game.
To summarize, during this procedure we only keep in memory: (i) the vertex on which the
lasso will loop; (ii) the vertex we are guessing and its predecessor; (iii) {λk(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ}.
It is at most |V | values less or equal to K where K is at most exponential in the size of
the input (Corollary 36); (iv) {λk(u) | u ∈ V Jm} if we are guessing π[m]. Once again at
most |V | values less or equal to K; (v) a counter CL ≤ 2 · |C(λk≥ℓ)|; (vi) a counter CT
which is equal either to 0 or 1. All these different values can be encoded in polynomial
size memory. Notice that for (i) and (ii) a vertex is only a vertex in the game G, a subset
of Π and |Π| values in {0, . . . ,K} ∪ {+∞}.
IfM = c < +∞, we know, by Corollary 37, that the size of c cannot exceed an exponential
in the size of the input. We have to verify that: (i) there exists a lasso π such that the
corresponding play ρX in the extended game is such that Costi(ρ
X) = c and the length
of π is at most 2 · |C(λk≥ℓ)|; (ii) there does not exist a lasso π
′ such that the corresponding
play ρ′X in the extended game is such that Costi(ρ
′X) > c and the length of π′ is at
most 2 · |C(λk≥ℓ)|.
We proceed iteratively as follows: we first guess a lasso π such that Costi(ρ
X) ≥ d with
d = 0. If it exists, we repeat the same procedure with d = 1. At some point, there will
exist a lasso π such that Costi(p
X) ≥ d for some d ∈ N but there does not exist a lasso
π′ such that Costi(ρ
′X) ≥ d+1. If d is equal to the value M that we have guessed, then
we have guessed the good maximum.
To guess the different lassoes π, we proceed as for the case M = +∞ but we keep an
additionnal counter C which keeps track of the cost of player i for the lasso (and so
indirectly for the corresponding play in the extended game) that we are guessing. But,
once again, this value is at most exponential in the size of the input.
This conclude the proof that {λk+1(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ} can be computed in PSPACE.
To conclude the global proof, it remains to proof that mR(λk+1≥ℓ ) can be computed in
PSPACE. Clearly we can compute mR(λk+1ℓ ) in PSPACE as we now have {λ
k+1(v) | v ∈
V Jℓ} in memory and we can compute mR(λk+1>ℓ ) = mR(λ
k+1
≥ℓ+1) = mR(λ
k
≥ℓ+1) (as k > k
∗
ℓ+1
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the region XJℓ+1 has already reached its local fixpoint) in PSPACE by induction hypothesis
and this value is at most exponential in the size of the input (by Corollary 36). So, as
mR(λk+1≥ℓ ) = max(mR(λ
k+1
ℓ ),mR(λ
k+1
>ℓ )), assertion (22) is proved.
If k > k∗ℓ , the local fixpoint of regionX
Jℓ is reached and then by Proposition 17 {λk+1(v) |
v ∈ V Jℓ} = {λk(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ} and mR(λk+1≥ℓ ) = mR(λ
k
≥ℓ) and (22) is proved. ◭
Jℓ
. . . . . .X
≥Jℓ
We know {λk(v) | v ∈ V Jℓ}.
We can compute {λk(v) |
v ∈ V J
′
} for all J ′ > Jℓ
and mR(λk≥ℓ) in PSPACE.
Figure 4 Induction hypothesis for the computation of λk+1.
We are now able to prove Propisition 38.
Proof of Proposition 38. Let (G, v0) be an initialized reachability game and let x, y ∈ (N∪
{+∞})|Π| be two thresholds. Let (X , x0) be its extended game with x0 = (v0, I0). Let
C(λ∗≥I0) be the counter graph restricted to the arena X
≥I0 and so |C(λ∗≥I0)| = |V | · 2
|Π| ·
(K0 + 1)|Π| with K0 = mR(λ∗≥I0 ). Let us recall that K
0 can be computed (resp. encoded)
in PSPACE thanks to Proposition 39 (resp. Corollary 36).
We have to guess a lasso π = hgω in the counter graph C(λ∗≥I0) such that its correspond-
ing play ρX in the extended game satisfies the constraints, i.e., xi ≤ Costi(ρX) ≤ yi for all
i ∈ Π. The length L of π is at most max(max{yi | yi < +∞}, |C(λ∗≥I0)|) + 2 · |C(λ
∗
≥I0
)| as
the cycle of π can appear after the constraints yi < +∞ are satisfied.
In order to have a PSPACE procedure, we cannot guess π entirely and we have to proceed
region by region. If I0 = Jℓ for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we consider the region decomposition
π[ℓ]π[ℓ + 1] . . . π[t] of π, with t ∈ {ℓ, . . . , N}, where some sections π[m] may be empty.
We first guess the first vertex of the cycle g and then we guess successively π[ℓ]π[ℓ + 1]
and so on. To guess π[m] with ℓ ∈ {m, . . . , t}, assuming it is not empty, we guess one by
one its vertices. To guess a vertex (v′, Jm, (c
′
i)i∈Π) we only have to keep its predecessor in
memory and to know the value λ∗(v′, Jm). So, we need to know {λ∗(v) | v ∈ V Jm}. Thanks
to Proposition 39, we can obtain this set in polynomial size memory and once we move to
another region, we can forget this set and compute the new one.
Additionally, we have a counter CL to count the length of π and for each player i ∈ Π
we have a counter Ci keeping track the current cost of player i along π. For all i ∈ Π,
we have that Ci, CL ≤ L. Henceforth, all these counters can be encoded with polynomial
size memory. Moreover, in addition to these counters, we currently maintain: (i) the first
vertex of g, (ii) the current vertex we are guessing, (iii) its predecessor and, (iv) the set
{λ∗(v) | v ∈ V Jm} (only |V | values which can be encoded in polynomial size memory by
Corollary 36) if we are guessing π[m]. As for (ii) and (iii) a vertex in the counter graph
is composed of a vertex of V , a subset I of Π and |Π| counter values which are at most
exponential in the input (Corollary 36), all this procedure can be done in PSPACE. ◭
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5.2 PSPACE hardness
We now prove that the constraint problem is PSPACE-hard for quantitative reachability
games.
◮ Proposition 40. The constraint problem for quantitative reachability games is PSPACE-
hard.
The proof of this proposition is based on a polynomial reduction from the QBF problem
which is PSPACE-complete. It is close to the proof given in [10] for the PSPACE-hardness
of the constraint problem for Boolean games with reachability objectives – either a player
reaches his objective or not. The main difference is here to manipulate costs instead of
considering qualitative reachability.
The QBF problem is to decide whether a fully quantified Boolean formula ψ is true.
The formula ψ can be assumed to be in prenex normal form Q1x1Q2x2 . . . Qmxm φ(X) such
that the quantifiers are alternating existential and universal quantifiers (Q1 = ∃, Q2 = ∀,
Q3 = ∃, . . .), X = {x1, x2, . . . , xm} is the set of quantified variables, and φ(X) = C1∧. . .∧Cn
is an unquantified Boolean formula overX equal to the conjunction of the clauses C1, . . . , Cn.
Such a formula ψ is true if there exists a value of x1 such that for all values of x2,
there exists a value of x3 . . ., such that the resulting valuation ν of all variables of X
evaluates φ(X) to true. Formally, for each odd (resp. even) k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, let us denote
by fk : {0, 1}k−1 → {0, 1} (resp. gk : {0, 1}k−1 → {0, 1}) a valuation of variable xk given
a valuation of previous variables x1, . . . , xk−1
4. Given theses sequences f = f1, f3, . . . and
g = g2, g4, . . ., let us denote by ν = ν(f,g) the valuation of all variables of X such that
ν(x1) = f1, ν(x2) = g2(ν(x1)), ν(x3) = f3(ν(x1)ν(x2)), . . .. Then
ψ = Q1x1Q2x2 . . .Qmxm φ(X) is true
if and only if
there exist f = f1, f3, . . . such that for all g = g2, g4, . . ., the valuation νf,g evaluates φ(X)
to true.
Proof of Proposition 40. Let us detail a polynomial reduction from the QBF problem to the
constraint problem for quantitative reachability games. Let ψ = Q1x1Q2x2 . . . Qmxm φ(X)
with φ(X) = C1 ∧ . . .∧Cn be a fully quantified Boolean formula in prenex normal form. We
build the following quantitative reachability game Gψ = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, (Costi)i∈Π, (Fi)i∈Π)
(see Figure 5):
the set V of vertices:
for each variable xk ∈ X under quantifier Qk, there exist vertices xk, ¬xk and qk;
for each clause Ck, there exist vertices ck and tk;
there exists an additional vertex tn+1;
the set E of edges:
from each vertex qk there exist an edge to xk and an edge to ¬xk;
from each vertex xk and ¬xk, there exists an edge to qk+1, except for k = m where
this edge is to c1;
from each vertex ck, there exist an edge to tk and an edge to ck+1, except for k = n
where there exist an edge to tn and an edge to tn+1;
there exists a loop on each tk;
4 Notice that f1 : ∅ → {0, 1}.
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the set Π of n+ 2 players:
each player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, owns vertex ci;
player n + 1 (resp. n + 2) is the player who owns the vertices qi for each existential
(resp. universal) quantifier Qi;
as all other vertices have only one outgoing edge, it does not matter which player owns
them;
each function Costi is associated with the target set Fi defined as follows:
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Fi = {ℓ ∈ V | ℓ is a literal of clause Ci} ∪ {ti};
Fn+1 = {tn+1};
Fn+2 = {t1, . . . , tn}.
q1 q2 q3 . . . qm c1 . . . cn tn+1
x1
¬x1
x2
¬x2
xm
¬xm
t1 tn
Figure 5 Reduction from the formula ψ to the quantitative reachability game Gψ
◮ Remark 41. (1) Notice that a sequence f of functions fk : {0, 1}k−1 → {0, 1}, with k
odd, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, as presented above, can be translated into a strategy σn+1 of player n+ 1
in the initialized game (Gψ , q1), and conversely. Similarly, a sequence g of functions gk :
{0, 1}k−1 → {0, 1}, with k even, 1 ≤ k ≤ m is nothing else than a strategy σn+2 of
player n + 2. (2) Notice also that if ρ is a play in (Gψ, q1), then Costn+1(ρ) < +∞ if and
only if Costn+2(ρ) = +∞. Moreover, suppose that ρ visits tn+1, then for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Costi(ρ) ≤ 2 ·m if and only if for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ρ visits a vertex that is a literal of Ci, and
that is the case if and only if there is a valuation of all variables of X that evaluates φ(X)
to true.
Consider the game Gψ and the bound x = (2 ·m, . . . , 2 ·m, 2 ·m+ n,+∞). Both can be
constructed from ψ in polynomial time. Let us now show that ψ is true if and only if there
exists an SPE in (Gψ , q1) with cost ≤ x.
(⇒) Suppose that ψ is true. Then there exists a sequence f of functions fk : {0, 1}k−1 →
{0, 1}, with k odd, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, such that for all sequences g of functions gk : {0, 1}k−1 →
{0, 1}, with k even, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, the valuation νf,g evaluates φ(X) to true. We define a
strategy profile σ as follows:
for player n + 1, his strategy σn+1 is the strategy corresponding to the sequence f (by
Remark 41);
for player n + 2, his strategy is an arbitrary strategy σn+2; we denote by g the corres-
ponding sequence gk : {0, 1}k−1 → {0, 1}, with k even, 1 ≤ k ≤ m (by Remark 41);
for each player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
if hv ∈ Histi(q1) with v = ci, is consistent with σn+1, then σi(hv) = ci+1 if i 6= n and
tn+1 otherwise
else σi(hv) = ti.
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Let us first prove that the play ρ = 〈σ〉q1 has a cost ≤ x = (2 ·m, . . . , 2 ·m, 2 ·m+n,+∞).
By hypothesis, the valuation νf,g evaluates φ(X) to true, that is, it evaluates all clauses Ci
to true. Hence by Remark 41, ρ visits a vertex of Fi for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and by definition
of σ, ρ eventually loops on tn+1. It follows that Costi(ρ) ≤ 2 · m for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Costn+1(ρ) ≤ 2 ·m+ n, and Costn+2(ρ) = +∞. Hence Cost(ρ) ≤ x.
Let us now prove that σ is an SPE, that is, for each history hv ∈ Hist(q1), there is no
one-shot deviating strategy in the subgame (Gψ↾h, v) that is profitable to the player who
owns vertex v (by Proposition 6). This is clearly true for all v = ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, since ti
has only one outgoing edge. For the other vertices v, we study two cases:
hv is consistent with σn+1: Notice that hv is maybe not consistent with σn+2, but
with another arbitrary strategy σ′n+2. Let g
′ be the sequence corresponding to σ′n+2
by Remark 41. By hypothesis, the valuation νf,g′ evaluates φ(X) to true. Hence as
explained previously for 〈σ〉q1 , the cost of play ρ = h〈σ↾h〉v is such that Costi(ρ) ≤ 2 ·m
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Costn+1(ρ) ≤ 2 · m + n, and Costn+2(ρ) = +∞. If v belongs to
player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, this player has no incentive to deviate since he has already visited
his target set along h and thus cannot decrease his cost. If v belongs to player n+ 1, a
one-shot deviation will lead to a play eventually looping on t1 by definition of σ, thus
leading to a cost +∞ which is not profitable for player n + 1. Finally if v belongs to
player n + 2, a one-shot deviation will not decrease his cost by definition of σ (σn+2 is
arbitrary).
hv is not consistent with σn+1: Suppose that v = ck. Then by definition of σ, the play
h〈σ↾h〉v eventually loops on tk leading to a cost ≤ 2 ·m+k for player k. In fact, if player
k has already seen his target set along hv, using a one-shot deviation in the subgame
(Gψ↾h, v) leads to the same cost for him. Otherwise, it leads to a cost equal to +∞:
indeed, deviating here means going to the state ck+1 (or tn+1 if k = n, which leads to a
cost of +∞ for player n), and since hv is not consistent with σn+1, by definition of σk+1,
player k + 1 will choose to go to tk+1. This player has thus no incentive to deviate.
Suppose that v = qk. Then by definition of σ, the play ρ = h〈σ↾h〉v eventually loops on
t1. It follows that Costn+1(ρ) = +∞ and Costn+2(ρ) = 2 ·m+ 1. Due to the structure
of the game graph, 2 ·m+1 is the smallest cost that player n+2 is able to obtain. So if
qk ∈ Vn+2, player n+2 has no incentive to deviate. And if qk ∈ Vn+1, player n+1 could
try to use a one-shot deviating strategy, however the resulting play still eventually loops
on t1.
This proves that σ is an SPE and we already showed that its cost was bounded by x.
(⇐) Suppose that there exists an SPE σ in (Gψ , q1) with outcome ρ such that Cost(ρ) ≤ x.
In particular Costn+1(ρ) < +∞. By Remark 41, it follows that Costn+2(ρ) = +∞. We have
to prove that ψ is true. To this end, consider the sequence f of functions fk : {0, 1}k−1 →
{0, 1}, with k odd, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, that corresponds to strategy σn+1 of player n + 1 by
Remark 41. Let us show that for all sequences g of functions gk : {0, 1}k−1 → {0, 1}, with
k even, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, the valuation νf,g evaluates φ(X) to true.
By contradiction assume that it is not the case for some sequence g′ and consider the
related strategy σ′n+2 of player n+2 by Remark 41. Notice that σ
′
n+2 is a finitely deviating
strategy. Let us consider the outcome ρ′ of the strategy profile (σ′n+2, σ−(n+2)) from q1.
As Costn+2(ρ) = +∞, we must have Costn+2(ρ′) = +∞, otherwise σ′n+2 is a profitable
deviation for player n + 2 whereas σ is an SPE. It follows that Costn+1(ρ
′) < +∞ by
Remark 41, that is, ρ′ eventually loops on tn+1.
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Now recall that the valuation νf,g′ evaluates φ(X) to false, which means that it evaluates
some clause Ck of φ(X) to false. Consider the history hck < ρ
′. As strategy σ′n+2 only acts
on the left part of the underlying graph of Gψ , we have ρ′ = 〈σ′n+2, σ−(n+2)〉q1 = h〈σ↾h〉ck .
In the subgame (Gψ↾h, ck), the outcome of σ↾h gives a cost of +∞ to player k because
ρ′ = h〈σ↾h〉ck does not visit tk and νf,g′ evaluates Ck to false. In this subgame, player k has
thus a profitable one-shot deviation that consists to move to tk. It follows that σ is not an
SPE which is impossible. Then ψ is true.
◭
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